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
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# CATHOLIC MIND September-October, 1960

Phenomenon of Man
Fertility Pills
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ARTICLES . PAPAL AND EPISCOPAL STATEMENTS . ADDRESSES



# CATHOLIC MIND 58th Year • An America Press Publication

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EDITORIAL OFFICE 329 West 108 Street, New York 25, N. Y.

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BUSINESS OFFICE 920 Broadway New York 10, N.Y.

One Year-\$3.00 Two Years-\$5.00 Foreign-\$3.50 Yearly

SEPT.-OCT., 1960 VOL. LVIII, No. 1151

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• Few books have attracted more attention among both scientists and philosophers than *The Phenomenon of Man*, a posthumous work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J. The renowned palaeontologist saw man as "the ascending arrow of a great biological synthesis." Because this synthesis has evolution as its basic principle of explanation, the book has generated much controversy in Catholic philosophical and theological circles. In Man—In the Vision of Teilhard de Chardin (p. 402) a theologian, Cyril Vollert, S.J., puts the controversial book in balanced perspective.

We suggest, however, that the reader first turn to our lead article, What About Evolution? by J. Franklin Ewing, S.J. In so far as it discusses the developing attitude of the Church toward evolutionary theory, it provides an excellent introduction to Father

Vollert's critique of The Phenomenon of Man.

• ARCHBISHOP PATRICK A. O'BOYLE reminds the Catholic press of its cardinal responsibility to speak The Truth in Charity (p. 411).

- In Bad Morals, Good Books and Vice Versa (p. 416) America's Literary Editor, Harold C. Gardiner, S.J., lays down a few canons for the guidance of readers.
- Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut (p. 422) takes to task the unrealistic neutralists who see nuclear war a greater threat than the loss of our cherished liberties.
- WILLIAM J. GIBBONS, S.J. discusses fertility pills in MEDICAL RESEARCH AND FERTILITY CONTROL (p. 429).
- ARCHBISHOP KARL J. ALTER and PAUL SIMON, a Lutheran member of the Illinois State Legislature, discuss a Catholic in the Presidency from different points of view. Archbishop Alter replies to NINETEEN QUESTIONS ABOUT A CATHOLIC PRESIDENT (p. 440) that bother Protestants. Representative Simon talks frankly of Religion and Public Office (p. 450) to a group of Lutheran ministers.

THE CATHOLIC MIND, Sept.-Oct., 1960. Volume LVIII, No. 1151. Published bi-monthly by The America Press, 920 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y. Subscription postpaid: yearly \$3.00; Canada and foreign \$3.50; single copy 50 cents. Second Class Postage paid at New York, N.Y.



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# What About Evolution?

J. Franklin Ewing, S.J. Associate Professor of Anthropology Fordham University

NE HUNDRED years ago the world of print and thought was pre-occupied by the initial and fiery debates occasioned by the publication of Charles Darwin's The Origin of the Species. This dull-reading book had opened up a new world of thought, a new approach to nature. It inaugurated preoccupation with a universe of process, supplanting the previous static universe. It ushered in a host of problems compared with which the problems raised by Galileo, Newton and even modern physicists are relatively simple.

Tonight, I am going to restrict myself to biological evolution, and particularly to the biological evolution of man. Not only do I find that people in general are more interested in man, but I believe that Catholic audiences are more interested in how a theory of the evolution of man can be reconciled with Catholic belief and theology. What is the intellectual situation today, March 7, 1960, from the point of view of the Catholic?

This question is a large order, and we shall not satisfy everybody in an hour. But we shall try to give an

The eleventh annual St. Thomas Aquinas Lecture, Manhattan College, New York, N.Y., March 7, 1960.

outline of principal ideas, under these headings: 1) evolution as science sees it; 2) evolution and theology; 3) evolution and philosophy.

# As Science Sees It

What some scientists call the "fact" of evolution (although I do not myself fully approve of the term) has become not so much a question of proving the truth of evolution, as accepting a dimension of thought. This is true not only of biological evolution but of other evolutions, too. The Abbé Breuil, the great French prehistorian, has called time the great discovery of the nineteenth century. Certainly, the historical perspective has invaded all disciplines, today. Returning to the biological, we may well recall the question of Father Teilhard de Chardin, S.J., in an article in the 20's. He asks, may not a biologist study the history of life?

Rather than describe the scientific aspects of evolution, I prefer to spend a few minutes on a concept of which I am sure this audience is aware, but which can never be insisted on too much. I refer to the division of areas (or levels) of materials, methods and knowledge.

There are three such areas—the scientific, the philosophical and the theological. Recognition of these areas is essential to our consideration of evolution. It may also clear up much of the opposition of Catholics to "evolution."

On the scientific level, we deal with phenomena. We measure them,

we count them, we put them through the statistical mill, we draw immediate conclusions of a hypothetical and a functional nature. In the old-fashioned language of my youth, science answers the question "How?" In attempting to answer this question, science seeks an ever better accommodation of its idea of the universe to the universe itself. The model, the hypothesis, the perfecting of the question asked of nature, plus empirical verification and the erection of new hypotheses—these are the primary tools of science.

Considering the number of letters I receive after the publication of an article, I do not think it out of place to insert a footnote here. The name "science" as applied to the modern natural science has only a vague resemblance to the meaning of the word "science" to Aristotle and St. Thomas. Modern natural science is not even seeking certain knowledge derived from causes.

During a recent discussion, I was temporarily thrown off balance by the statement of another discussant that there was no finality for science. For a few moments, I thought I should have to stand up for the final cause and for finality in the universe. Fortunately, before I said something I might regret later, I realized that the speaker meant that science could never, at any point in time, state a conclusion as absolutely final, that is, never possibly to be revised. In fact, one reason why many scientists find it difficult to appreciate dogma is the habit of systematic doubt.

The second area is that of philosophy, which on the one hand takes into account the world of reality as proposed by science or humanity in general, but on the other hand has a basic method all its own. This method is that of reflective analysis. Philosophy seeks to answer the question "Why?"

It is an unfortunate fact that most people, and most scientists, in our day and age, do not understand the difference in area between science and philosophy. Most of the scientists I know—chiefly anthropologists—are anti-meta-physics, without knowing what metaphysics may be. Inasmuch as they do not realize that you have to have a philosophy to be a man at all, their concept of philosophy is amorphous, and they are unaware of the crossing of the boundary.

Let me give you the simplest example I can think of. In a certain textbook of cultural anthropology, the writer notes that an action is considered wrong by one culture, and right by another. "Therefore," he says, there are no possible absolute norms of morality. He does not realize that with the word "therefore" he is crossing over from science to philosophy. Similarly, many scientists from Thomas Huxley to Sir Julian Huxley have never realized that when they propose a doctrine of materialistic evolution and Catholics oppose it we are opposing not a scientific evolution but the philosophy of materialism.

Finally, we have the area of theology, the science concerned with Revelation. I do not think that a Catholic audience needs any elucidation of this area, particularly as I shall now turn immediately to the second division of my talk tonight.

# As Theology Sees It

I shall divide this part of my talk into three sections: 1) the structure of belief in the Catholic Church; 2) the history of the Catholic attitude toward evolution, 1859-1960; 3) the present situation.

# The structure of belief in the Catholic Church.

For the Catholic, the doctrines he must believe were propounded by Christ and form what is technically called "the deposit of faith." The Church, as the continuation of the mission of the historical Christ (what we know as the Mystical Body of Christ), interprets and guards this deposit of faith. "Interprets," because each age has its own peculiar difficulties and language and circumstance; and "guards" because there can be no discrepancy between what Christ taught at the beginning of the Christian era, and what the Church teaches today.

The scientific theologian finds that the truths of revelation and deductions from these truths are not all of the same rank, as they might be, say in the mind of a pious peasant. Some truths are defined, solemnly proclaimed as belonging to the deposit of faith. Thus, for our purposes, the existence of a spiritual soul in man was defined by the Council of Vienne (1311-12).

Other truths are so clear from Scripture or the universal belief of Catholics that they have not needed to be defined (they are definable). Thus, there has been no need to define the doctrine that God is the universal Creator.

Then again, certain propositions are so immediately derivable from the fonts of revelation that their denial would bring a person to the brink of heresy. Theologians distinguish various lower levels of propositions, to the merely probable.

The Church practices an economy in the matter of definitions. But Catholics need to be guided, here and now, from day to day, in religious matters that are current. Here we have what is called the ordinary teaching power of the Church. Thus, if the Pope approves of a decree of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, this decree demands from the Catholic what is technically called "prudential assent," which means that this is the norm of thinking of the Catholic here and now. Because of circumstances the expression of this teaching may change, in the future; but today it is his safe guide.

The highest expression of the ordinary teaching power of the Church is the papal encyclical. Here, the Pope does not normally use his prerogative of infallibility; in other words, he is not defining a doctrine. But, short of this, the encyclical is of the highest authority for the Catholic, here and now.

In addition to all this, we must consider the role of the theologians in the actual doctrinal and moral life of the Church. We have mentioned the economy that the Church manifests in definitions; this is also true of its ordinary teaching power. Where the official Church is not drawn into the discussion, she leaves the situation to her theologians. These are public teachers, usually in seminaries, subject to the supervision of the Church. It is hardly to be expected that these theologians could for long teach error, without being brought up short by the Church. Not only is the Church the Mystical Body of Christ, a body whose informing divine spirit is the Holy Spirit, but even its human constitution would militate against long-term and widespread error among the theologians of the world.

Hence, the safest thing that a Catholic could do, at any given point of time, would be to adopt the common teaching of theologians. Humanly speaking, since they are professionals and he is not, this would be wise.

Perhaps even for some Catholics, certainly for many non-Catholics, it may seem difficult to understand how the opinion of Catholic theologians could change. After all, do not Catholics so often proclaim the fact that their Faith is unchangeable?

The history of the Catholic attitude toward evolution, 1859-1960.

Let us consider the situation of the theologian in 1859 and in the years that followed.

He experienced a sense of shock.

Up to that time, science had told him of a hierarchic universe, arranged by a Creator who had created each plant and animal species and fitted it into a beautifully ordered structure. As for man, the theologian had never any reason to doubt the literal interpretation of the appropriate passages of Genesis and other parts of the Bible. The theologian was concerned with several consequences of the new doctrine.

First of all, he was concerned about Holy Scripture and its interpretation. The first rule of this interpretation was laid down centuries before by St. Augustine, and was reiterated by Pope Leo XIII in his great encyclical on the study of the Bible, Providentissimus Deus, This rule stated that a text of Holy Writ was to be taken as literal, unless reason or necessity informed us that it was not meant literally. In the application of this rule, the theologian should exercise a proper conservatism. After all, he is not dealing with something trivial; he is to guard the deposit of faith and he is the custodian of the salvation of the peoples.

Thus, and properly, he asked for the evidence. It is easy for us, in 1960, to look back and possibly to look down on the theologian of 1859. May I point out that we should also look down on the scientist of 1859? With regard to evolution in general, there was considerable evidence; with regard to the evolution of man there was no evidence. The primary and positive

evidence for the evolution of any given family or form is the palaeon-tological. What we dig up in successive strata gives us the actual history. In 1859, there was no palaeontological evidence for the evolution of man. During the last twenty-five years, we have unearthed more human fossils than in the previous history of the world. Should this make us feel superior to the theologian of 1859?

Even as time went on, and evidence began to appear, the theologian asked the scientist for such clear and certain conclusions as he could use in reinterpreting Holy Writ. As each new fossil was discovered, a spate of pro and con opinions appeared in the scientific journals. This was of no use to the theologian. Even now, when the majority opinion on all but the very latest fossils has been formed, it is difficult for the theologian to learn about it.

In addition, it was not completely fortunate that the theory of evolution became linked for a number of years with the specific theory of Darwinism. At that time, and even now, this specific theory had weaknesses which laid itself open to attack. Writers who so attacked, very often believed that they had thus laid evolution itself low.

At any rate, let us recognize the fact that, on academic levels, evolution in 1859 (and for some time afterwards) did not have the evidence of the sort that the theologian needed to make him change his interpretation of Sacred Scripture and

of the traditional Christian picture

of the origin of man.

Secondly, the theologian (and the Church) had to think not only of learned people, but of all the people in the Church. From 1859 on, Catholic writers made it clear that an evolution which allowed of the human spiritual soul and of God was not in conflict with any Catholic dogma. But it was increasingly difficult to keep the distinction between spiritualistic evolution and materialistic evolution clear in all minds. The loudest voices supporting evolution, unfortunately, were those of such people as Huxley and Haeckel, who were missionaries of materialism, and who proclaimed with brazen voices that evolution was a substitute for God. This a theologian could hardly welcome!

Nor was this all. The theologian could not deal even with materialistic evolution as an isolated phenomenon. Christianity and Christian principles were under attack from all sides. The world of business and politics, to mention but two phases of European culture, early adopted "the law of nature, red in tooth and claw," as did the United States Courts, with the more polite phrase, "the survival of the fittest." The moral law was reduced to similar principles. Holy Scripture was under severe fire by those who tried to prove that it was unworthy of belief.

I have recently written a popular article on evolution entitled: "Is Evolution a Bad Word?" Is it any wonder that for Catholics in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-

tury, or even for Catholics today, it did become a bad word?

In addition to his reasoning from older sources, the theologian receives information from time to time, as the Church acts, either as an administrative body, or as expressing the ordinary teaching power.

We may cite several of these socalled "private acts," as well as appropriate documents of public value.

In 1876, St. George Mivart published his Genesis of Species, and he was awarded an honorary Ph.D degree by Pope Leo XIII. Mivart was a Catholic and an evolutionist, although not a Darwinian. Later, evidently, a reaction set in and several authors who showed themselves favorable to evolution were asked quietly to remove their books from the market. It seems perfectly clear that these "private acts" were purely administrative, and were concerned with the good of the total Catholic population. Roman officials were alarmed at the bad effects of "evolution" as popularly understood, and not about spiritualistic evolution itself. Nothing like this has happened since 1909, although numerous Catholic writers have declared themselves favorable to a proper evolution.

The beginning of the modern era in the Catholic attitude towards evolution occurred on two dates. As regards official documents the year was 1909. In terms of theological thought, the year was 1921.

In 1909 were published the decrees of the Biblical Commission. This Commission was erected in

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1902 by Pope Leo XIII. The decrees of this Commission, composed of a body of Cardinals and scholars, were approved by the Pope. They are important to the Catholic. For they form part of the ordinary teaching power of the Church. They may, in the future, be changed with regard to expression; they must be read today in terms of the historical situation in which they were rendered.

In 1909, attacks on the Bible were hot and heavy. The Modernists claimed the Bible was beautiful and religious literature, but had no relation to historical reality. The Fundamentalists insisted that every word of the Bible was literally meant to be expressed by God. The Higher Critics had so analyzed the various parts of the Bible as to reduce it to a mere compilation of previous documents; this meant that the traditional authors of the various books never had existed, and that the Bible was a purely human book.

The decrees of the Biblical Commission were eminently Catholic inasmuch as they stood for the middle way, between the abysses of Modernism and of Fundamentalism. In sum, these decrees said that there was literal history in the Bible, especially with regard to the fundamentals of Catholic theology, but that there was also the element of what we have come to know as the "literary form." In any case, and with particular reference to our preoccupation this evening with the evolution of man, we are allowed to hark back to the remark of Cardinal Baronius during the Galileo dispute: "Holy Writ does not tell us how the heavens go, but how we can go to heaven." In other words, Scripture is not a textbook of science.

The Bible is a book written under the inspiration of God, it is true, but put down in so many words by human authors. When God wants to reveal His Truth to humans. He has to adapt Himself to us humans. He has to use a human language (otherwise who could understand Him?), and a human language implies the total culture of the people who use this language. The early Hebrew writers of the Bible, for example, had a definite picture of the physical universe. Thus, there were waters below the land, and there were waters above. The stars were pin-holes through which light came. Obviously, God was not constrained by such concepts; and vet, obviously, God used them. And these concepts did not really bind us to a belief in the primitive Hebrew concept of the physical universe. We have to interpret the Biblical text, not in terms of the ancient Hebrew universe, but in terms of the religious message that God meant to teach us.

Before I go on to cite other official documents emanating from Rome, I should interject a mention of a book by a theologian which I consider a watershed. This book is *Darwinism and Catholic Thought* (English edition in 1922), by Canon Henri Dorlodot. Not only was this the first exceptional favorable book on the subject by a theologian, but Canon Dorlodot's pupil, Fr. E. C. Messenger pursued the subject further with

his book, Evolution and Theology (1932), edited Theology and Evolution (1949), and contributed a definitive article on the subject of evolution in God, Man, and the Universe, edited by Jacques de Bivort de la Saudée. This is the first book I recommend to intellectuals on the subject of evolution, and indeed many other subjects.

Coming back to official documents, we have two encyclicals of Pope Pius XII to consider. The first, Divino Afflante, in 1943, brought the great encyclical of Leo XIII on Sacred Scripture up to date. Pius XII not only insisted on the great effort to be expended by Scripture scholars on the study of Eastern ways of expression; he also points out that many problems that were preoccupying the attention of scholars in the time of Leo XIII had since been solved. He therefore urged patient labor, but hopeful labor.

In 1950, the encyclical *Humani Generis* briefly touched on the subject of human evolution. This is the first ecclesiastical document of top importance in terms of the ordinary teaching power of the Church which clearly states that the evolution of the human body is a subject which may be freely discussed by those who, the Pope adds, know what they are talking about.

This excludes the average journalist. For there are certain qualifications involved here. One must admit the existence of a spiritual soul for each human being, one must be ready to submit to the judgment of the Church. These are not surprising qualifications for the Catholic.

In addition, Catholics are not to act as if evolution was a provably certain fact, or think that there are not still areas of obscurity involved in forming an immediate synthesis between traditional Catholic doctrine and evolution. As I sometimes tell my students: "It is possible to live in the same world with a problem, and to enjoy working away at the solution to the problem!" Finally, Pius XII has some firm things to say about polygenism. Polygenism, either in the sense of multiple origins of modern humanity, or in the sense that Adam and Eve were groups of human beings, can hardly be squared with Catholic doctrine.

Adam and Eve seem to be a rock of contradiction to many of my scientific friends. Their existence seems to imply a direct opposition between science and religion. Actually there is no point-to-point opposition. Science knows nothing about Adam and Eve. One can hardly expect the archeologist to dig up two skeletons, each with a brass plate on its chest, the one reading This is Adam" and the other "This is Eve." No, science deals with groups, even if these groups are often represented by fragmentary individuals.

Interestingly enough, the mathematical work of Sewall Wright, of Chicago University, on breeding populations, mutations, natural selection and evolution, has led this eminent scientist to the conclusion that mutations can only be fixed in

small populations. Indeed, he speaks of bottleneck populations, which may be reduced to a single pair. This is far from being a proof of Adam and Eve, but it does show that the opposition is not point-topoint.

The present situation.

Varying with nation and background, theologians of our own time are, by and large, becoming more favorable to a spiritualistic evolution. I admit that I have not made a statistical survey; I admit that some are still obdurately opposed to any form of evolution. Yet I think my statement is broadly true. The climate of theological opinion is changing. I base this statement on extensive reading, and even more on conversations with theologians. I grant you that the situation is not such that one could make it clear to the congregation of the 12:15 Mass on Sunday!

This change is due to two factors. The first factor is extra-theological. More human and pre-human fossils have been unearthed in the last twenty or so years than ever before in the history of the world. Thus, the evidence for the evolution of the human body, as opposed to the literal interpretation of the text of Genesis which describes God as molding this body from "the slime of the earth," is so vastly increased, as to cause many theologians to consider it verging on the certain. As a scientist, I personally may say that I think it is as certain as possible in the nature of the evidence.

The second factor is theological. Students of Holy Writ have been obeying the injunction of Divino Afflante; they have been studying the "literary form" of the Bible. They have been delving into the "Oriental mind," the culture of the Near East where the Bible was written. They tell us, for instance, that the first verses of Genesis have a religious lesson-the creation of all things by God-but that the six days of creation are described as balances, one phrase against another, that do not represent real history as would a modern book of scientific history. They tell us, again for example, that the account of the formation of Eve does not mean that Eve was actually physically derived from the body of Adam, but that this account is meant to teach us a lesson, such as the headship of the human family by the man (a truth echoed by St. Paul much later).

One final remark, before I embark on my final (and brief) remarks about the philosophy of evolution.

I feel secure in saying that the majority of theologians, as a minimum requirement, would have this to say about the origin of man. God constituted our first parents human beings, and His action affected both body and soul. He may indeed have used as material for man's body an animal body prepared as far as possible by the processes of that nature that He Himself set in motion and sustained. But this body could not properly have been called human, unless its matter was elevated to the human plane. This elevated

vation may have been antecedent to, or concomitant with (but in any case because of) the infusion of the human soul. Any change occurred at the deeper level of reality—the philosophical perhaps, and it would escape the scrutiny of our present scientific methods. The point is: "God created man in His own image."

In talking about evolution from a scientific point of view, I feel a certain amount of confidence, because of my professional training and experience. When I discuss the pertinent theological considerations, I think I am on pretty firm ground, because I have tried to keep up with the literature during the last many vears. But this is the first time that I have dared to make some observations on the philosophy of evolution. Indeed, in this field, I am sure I am an amateur. Therefore, may I ask you to consider my final remarks of this evening rather as questions than as statements? At any rate, these remarks are directed rather toward stimulating thought and discussion than toward the formulation of hardened thesis.

I think that Scholastic philosophers should carefully reconsider the following four concepts and areas, in the light of all that we have learned about evolution. These four headings are: 1) essence; 2) species; 3) causality; 4) the hierarchic universe.

# Essence.

Far be it from me to enter here into a technical discussion of the

concept of essence. Indeed, for my purposes this evening, I have but two sentences to deliver under this heading.

The concept of essence, and more particularly the appraisal of an essence (for without the particular there is no possibility of a valid generalization), has now become a diachronic process. An essence must unfold its properties through a time span (here again, time is of the essence!), and this unfolding may require even millions of years for full emergence, as latent powers find successively realized the external conditions required for their going into action. We can no longer, it seems to me, judge the limits of the properties of a material essence merely from observing them statically, or during the single lifetime (or often several lifetimes) of individuals possessing this essence, at a relatively constricted point in time and space. Hence, the philosopher must not be too quick to conclude that a given species has changed essentially because it now manifests new powers never observed or in operation before.

# Species.

We all know that the word "species" means something quite different to the philosopher and to the biologist. Perhaps some Scholastic philosophers are not quite so sharply aware of two possible meanings of the word to the philosopher. The first meaning (and, I submit, the only true and useful one) is species as an intelligibility. By this I mean

that a species, a concept containing so many characteristics, may be applied to a concrete being. This being either has these characteristics, or it does not. In the first case, the fit is perfect (on the appropriate level). In the second case, the fit is imperfect, and thus the concrete being does not pertain to the species in question. There is here absolutely no implication that the concrete composite individuals embodying or incarnating a given specific intelligible structure here and now may not undergo or have undergone a transition from carrying this specific structure in its matter to carrying some other one, under the influence of adequate causal factors. In the case of such a change, it is not the species as such that changes, but only the individual or individuals possessing this structure.

The second meaning (and, I submit, an illegitimate one) is species as a sort of Platonic archetypal and unchangeable idea, which implies the unchangeability of the concrete creature. There is not, so far as I can see, any justification for this meaning of species, in reality. Cultural and historical factors enter into the development of this second meaning. Both cultural and philosophical criticism should be able to free us from such rigid Platonism

today.

With regard to these two concepts, essence and species, may I ask the following questions? What does distinguish one essence from another, objectively and in the real order, as opposed to taxonomic dif-

ferences which have been erected by philosophers? What is an accidental difference? Here again it seems to me that a diachronic study opens the way to a useful answer.

Causality.

Under this heading I hope to make my most basically pertinent remarks with regard to a Catholic

philosophy of evolution.

In my younger days, I remember, a phrase was used with presumably telling effect: "the effect cannot be greater than the cause." I think now that this phrase (which is, of course, true when considered in the pure and other-worldly light of the principle of causality) was used naively, and my appraisal is based on two considerations.

First, I can think of few, if any, effects in our contingent universe which have but one cause. What we have to work out, it seems to me, is a philosophy of systems. In the world of physics, it is a truism that an atom to which is added another electron is not simply an atom plus an additional electron. This atom is a new thing, because its structure. as well as its bulk, has been changed. There is a new configuration, a new whole. In cultural anthropology, we have found out that a culture trait. even a simple material object, is not like a brick which may be removed from one building and inserted in the wall of another building and suffer no change in the process. No, a culture trait in one culture is never the same after diffusion into another culture. It now exists in another configuration. This is another way of stating the anthropological truism: A way of life of a specific people is "culturally unique." The biologist long ago found out that the attempt to study an organism as if it were divorced from its environment led to pictures of life which were characterized by great ignorance. "No man is an island," and even islands are washed by the same great sea. The whole universe is a system of reciprocal relationships and intercausalities, if I may use the word. Causality, then, is not simple. What many causes cannot produce singly of themselves, they may be able to produce when combined in a system. But more than that: in a system the whole explains the parts.

Second, philosophers have often neglected the true value of the concurrence of God in the being and activity of the universe. As a matter of fact, I personally find even the term to be weak. For the tremendous fact is that God's creative action is not applied to His creatures once and for all, but is continuing. Otherwise, the creature would dissolve into nothingness. And God acts with the acts of His creatures, or else these acts should be impossible. This is an ennobling, glorious concept and reality. Man's fumbling but effective imitation of God the Creator is effective; it is noble, because of God the Creator. Descending to the needs of the moment, I say that the concurrence of God is the only real key to a proper philosophy of evolution.

We all believe that there is causality and finality in the universe. This is only so because of individual and systemic participation in the great finality, which is the plan in God's mind. Aristotle did not have this vision; for him all finalities were individual. This is real Thomism: what is of all-embracing importance is the participation of all contingent finalities in the transcendental Finality, the participation of all causalities in the infinite Causality.

# The hierarchic universe.

The modern concept of time, vast stretches available for the differentiation of life and its complexity, had its initial preparation in the Christian concept of time, as opposed to the cyclic time of the Greek philosophers. The realization of the resulting complexity as hierarchically organized, as structurally stratified, was eminently clear to St. Thomas. That the lower being prepared the way for the superior; that the superior being explained the inferior; that dispositive causes were subservient to the final cause; that the final cause made sense out of the dispositive causes—these are eminently Thomist ideas. May I venture to suggest that a true concept of evolution could not only be compatible with this relatively static view of the universe, but would extend it, make it dynamic? In other words, were St. Thomas alive today, would he not be actively engaged in wrestling with an evolutionary philosophy? Is not this the task of the modern philosopher?

It seems to me that the Catholic philosopher cannot rest, when he has declared two possibilities feasible. One possibility is that the hierarchic nature of the universe is due to continued interventions of God, plus a very limited amount of activity on the part of secondary causes. The other possibility is that God initiated a process which then needed no further primary power interventions (except in the case of the human soul), but, it goes without saying, is kept in being and action by His concurrence.

It seems to me that the Catholic philosopher cannot rest, after this proposal of two possibilities. In a day which needs more than ever Catholic leadership in thought, in a day which needs more than ever Catholic thought, the philosopher must grapple with a basic problem, which is the synthesis of transcendental values and realities with the world of process.

# The Scholar's Responsibility

Is it a little thing that man should realize his roots in nature? To study life and its laws, and to see the record of the gradual preparatory perfecting of the biological worlds, from the lesser to the greater; to appreciate the marvelous unfolding of consciousness and of personalization, ultimately registered in the nervous system, until it became the instrument of the spirit? To traverse unimaginable time and space, and to find in one direction the atom, and in the other himself, the partnership of nescient striving and conscious

liberty? To see the present in the past, and the past in the future? To realize that, on the higher level of the universal human community, evolution not only recapitulates the past but has taken on a human meaning and new direction, which involves not only individuals but all of us in the quest for the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, which ultimately is God? And, on a still higher and undeserved plane, to know well who that human is who is now able to be the humble collaborator with God Himself, whose Son did not disdain to be participant in and upraiser of our nature and our history?

No, all this is no little thing. In fact, it is so important as to present to the Catholic scholar a *categorical* responsibility.

The labor of elaborating a proper philosophy of evolution, a proper synthesis of the transcendental and the processive, of the absolute and the relative, is not the work of one day, nor of one man. Time will pass; many an idea and an attempt may become a casuality. But the determined, active and reappraising proposal of ideas is the urgent duty. It is hardly possible that one modern-day St. Thomas could encompass at once the details and the unifying principles of modern and ancient knowledge. But the spirit of St. Thomas should be our inspiration and model; a spirit which was broad, sympathetic with all knowledge, revolutionary, and devoted. He, I venture to say, would have found in a Catholic understanding of evolution a source of insight, an

enhanced and pertinent apologetic, and a source of hope. The dynamic development of hierarchic nature would have been for him a manifestation of the triumph of spirit through travail, a triumph of the past and the future, and a triumph of God.

Indeed, this is a fundamental challenge, rising above the minute and immediate exigencies of livelihood, or even of the hydrogen threat to humanity. For we are dedi-

cated to thought and theory. Without these there can be no proper practice. We are dedicated to the next generation. We have the privilege, and the corresponding responsibility, of sharing significantly in the growth and function of the Mystical Body of that Christ who took unto Himself our visible humanity, and through us the whole universe, and made of our history and our future a judgment, a hope, and a glory.

# Latin America's Problems

As Catholics we have good reason to be especially sympathetic and interested in the problems of Latin America. Many of the books published on Latin American affairs are written by secularists who have no rapport with the faith or culture of the people. In many instances these books do not even mention the Catholic Church as a factor on the Latin American scene. We, who possess a religious faith in common with our neighbors to the south, are better equipped to understand their problems. From understanding can come practical aid. What is needed in Latin America is not only massive aid from the United States Government and private investors. The time is ripe for spiritual and financial aid from American Catholics to bolster the magnificent work of Maryknoll, Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop Ritter and others who are sending priests to help the already overburdened clergy of Latin America.—John B. Sheerin, C.S.P., in the Catholic World, July, 1960.

The Christian cannot but experience exaltation at the thought of the magnificent harmony prevailing between Teilhard's scientific depiction of the world's movement and the deepest convictions of his faith.

# Man-

in the Vision of Teilhard de Chardin\*

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IN THESE changing times, when our age is leaving the "modern" world inaugurated by the Renaissance, and is heading in a new direction, the solutions supplied by the ancients to man's problems do not always suffice. We can still derive inspiration from the astounding energy displayed in previous epochs, particularly by the medieval thinkers when their era was young; but the answers we require will have to be

our own. Most definitely, these answers will have to be in harmony with the new challenges laid down by advancing knowledge of the microscopic and macroscopic universe. Anyone who ponders the vitality, both scientific and theological, with which Père Teilhard de Chardin, S.J., attempts to accommodate his interpretation of evolutionary processes to his vision of Christ, will begin to discern the valuable con-

<sup>\*</sup>Reprinted with permission from the Month, 31 Farm St., London, W. 1, May 1960.

tributions which a deep insight into the universe can yield for fresh expressions and, indeed, for fresh per-

ceptions in theology.

Teilhard's competence as a scientist, particularly in paleontology, is willingly acknowledged even by his bitterest critics. However, it is not his scientific eminence that has drawn so many to his side. He was above all a thinker, and, in a way, a prophet. Because of his extraordinary vision and his ability to express his insights in an attractive literary style, his influence on contemporary thought is great and is

bound to grow.

Sir Julian Huxley may be right when he asserts, in his introduction to the book, that Teilhard de Chardin has compelled "scientists to see the spiritual implications of their knowledge." Yet perhaps it is not altogether true that he has "forced theologians to view their ideas in the new perspective of evolution." Most of today's theologians, at least the most alert among them, do indeed thus view their ideas; however, Teilhard did not "force" many of them, but rather tended, initially at any rate, to antagonize them by his theological originality and unfamiliar terminology.

# Teilhard's Three Steps

To understand Teilhard's achievement in *The Phenomenon of Man*, three steps in his procedure must be carefully distinguished. He himself repeatedly insists that his methodology is scientific; his intention is to stick to the plane of experimental

observation, complemented by attempts at interpretation with the aid of hypotheses. A second step, still within the sphere of positive science, is the interpretation of the past and the future in the light of present knowledge. The source of much of the controversy about the book is the third step, which consists in the author's endeavor to synthesize the conclusions resulting from his scientific study of reality with aspects of his Christian knowledge gained from faith.

Most of the attacks aimed at Teilhard de Chardin betray a failure to grasp, or at least to keep in mind, the basic point of view directing his investigation. He undertakes to study man, not from every angle, but only as seen from the outside. He wishes to contemplate man purely as a phenomenon among others-the most important of all, to be sure, but still only as a phenomenon. He expressly disavows all pretense to metaphysics. The precise viewpoint is hard to define; it does not fit readily into any of our customary categories. Perhaps we should not be too far from the truth if we labeled it a sort of scientific cosmology, or "hyperphysics." Therefore we must not expect him to furnish a complete exposition of man's existential situation. To the philosopher and the theologian he leaves vast areas of study, which can be pursued only with the methods pertinent to philosophy and theology.

There may be some reason for dissatisfaction with Teilhard's procedures; there seems to be some confusion in methodology. Occasionally, without clear warning to the reader, he surmounts the phenomenal plane to engage in speculation that is surely philosophical, as when he discourses on the nature of man. On the other hand, when he touches on theology, and completes his exposition by introducing Christ or the Mystical Body, his intention of momentarily rising above the level of positive science is usually indicated.

# His Primary Objective

Teilhard's primary objective was to rescue evolution from the materialism which had appropriated it, and to restore it to its rightly spiritual domain. To do this while resolutely abiding on the positive level with his fellow scientists was not the easiest of tasks. Along with them, he was in full control of the facts established by science: the vast array of successive forms of life exhibiting an ever increasing complexity; the appearance and growth of psychic factors in some families of organisms; and a fully conscious mind at the culmination of one evolving line.

Contemplation of such facts led him to his perception of the evolutive unity of the universe, in which all energy converged toward the goal of maximum consciousness. As the universe is in process of spatial expansion from the infinitesimal to the immense, so also it is in process of organic involution upon itself, from the extremely simple to the extremely complex. This involution of

complexity is experimentally bound up with a correlative increase of consciousness. Teilhard's originality is found in his contention that terrestrial substances possess the property of becoming more vitalized as they become more complex.

The underlying assumption is that life has always been present within the deepest reaches of all matter. It did not suddenly burst forth at some definite instant and place. In every region of space and time, the stuff of the universe has an inner aspect at some point of itself; things have a Within that is co-extensive with their Without. This position is not, of course, confirmed by our experience. But an easy explanation is at hand: the psychic is so feeble in socalled "lifeless" things that it cannot be discovered by us; it is too rudimentary a consciousness, a sort of pre-life.

Yet it must be admitted, Teilhard holds, for in the last analysis there must be only a single energy at work in the world. With the increase of complexity, life eventually emerges in forms that can be recognized by us; and once it appears, it evolves according to its own necessary laws. Nervous systems followed the process of increasing complication and concentration. By the end of the Tertiary Era, an organism was fashioned among the primates that was remarkably rich and supple; this particular being continued to advance, and suddenly took an infinite leap forward. Almost nothing had changed outwardly, but a tremendous revolution took place within:

consciousness became capable of perceiving itself, and with thought the first man was born.

This startling leap occurred only once, at the very point where reflection was first achieved. Although science has nothing to say directly for or against monogenism (whether the human species at its origin is represented by one individual or couple), it does seem to come out decisively in favor of monophyletism (the initial unity of the human species in a

single phylum).

No philosophical or theological objection need be lodged against the law of complexity-consciousness which regulates evolution from the sub-atomic stage, where complexity and consciousness were at a minimum, to man, where they attain their supreme perfection. The law is formulated from a purely phenomenological point of view. Nor need scandal be taken at the omission of all mention of God's creative activity in producing the soul of man; for Teilhard's description of evolution does not exclude ontological discontinuity. He reminds us that the continuity observed by science is phenomenal, and concerned only with things as they appear. Under the phenomenal veil there is abundant room for God's special intervention in creating the human soul. Our minds may move on different and successive planes of knowledge; the plane here chosen by Teilhard is that of scientific observation. He is also within his rights when, adhering to the same plane, he refuses to elect between monogenism and polygenism; such a question is beyond the competence of positive science.

# The Problem of Human Destiny

Teilhard's deepest interest is in the future. His consuming desire was to contribute his solution to the problem of human destiny. After the appearance of man, the upward movement continues and mounts toward greater consciousness. But it does not tend to produce new human species. On the contrary, the goal is a heightened unity. As animal evolution eventually issued in a body capable of bearing a spiritual soul, so, on a higher level, human evolution little by little organizes a collective person that makes man ready for the ultimate stage of his perfection. The final end of the advance is not a multiplicity of persons, but a oneness of mankind in a super-organism that harbors no threat to the persons composing it. At its summit, evolution converges towards a personal, transcendent point, designated as Omega.

This is Teilhard's boldest and most pregnant idea. It introduces something entirely new into the program of evolution, something which perhaps will not be accepted by most scientists. All evolutive movement from the very beginning, during all the thousands of millions of years, had been heading towards convergence at the Point Omega, union with the transcendent God. The underlying energy at work has always been love, that is the affinity

of being with being.

This love is not peculiar to man, but is a general property of life, and is found in all the forms successively appearing in organized matter. In the mammals that are close to us we can easily recognize it in such manifestations as parental instinct and herding tendencies. In its remoter analogical varieties, for instance in the molecule, it is so rudimentary as to be imperceptible. In men it is their deepest source of power, and is the sole force that can unite them in such a way as to complete and fulfil them. Fuller being means closer union; and union among men is requisite for their union with God. the end of the entire movement of evolution. In Teilhard's still unpublished Le Christique, the Omega of evolution is identified with the Christ of Revelation.

The super-organism envisioned by Teilhard seems to be in the order of nature. Of course, natural procedures and the unity which they produce must be distinguished from supernatural procedures. Nevertheless all natural movements toward unity of consciousness are dispositions favorable to the Kingdom of Christ. Towards the latter stages of human history, when mankind unites in a collective personality, and Omega, the main unitive factor in the final period, exerts its attractive power, supernatural means are indispensable. In this sense evolution cannot achieve its climax without grace. But the unity prophesied by Teilhard is still on the phenomenal plane and does not compromise the gratuity of grace.

# Toward the Unity of Mankind

Such a view of evolution cannot but broaden and ennoble a man's outlook on life. It imparts to him a sense of his own importance and of his own responsibility; each of us has a task to perform in promoting future unity. Human growth towards collective organization and development of freedom can assist the progressive formation of Christ's Mystical Body, for they are wholesome conditions for the reception of the supernatural charity requisite for its structure. Mankind is invited. by its very nature, to realize a mounting unity of consciousness; and such natural progress can be employed, as a highly advantageous disposition, for the full flowering of supernatural life. Obviously, salvation is not the natural fruit of biological ascent; the grace that is to transfigure the world is certainly not the upward drive of evolution. Christ's grace, not evolution, will save us. But in Teilhard's view, Christ's grace makes use of evolution.

When we consider such developments, we may suspect that Teilhard the scientist has yielded the floor to Teilhard the Christian. In interpreting his vast hoard of facts he was undoubtedly swayed by his religious convictions. With utmost sincerity he tries to express his sense of the direction which evolution seems to be taking, and he frankly states that in his scientific eschatology he is moving in the domain of mere probabilities. Yet, at the moment

when hypotheses have to be introduced, he reasonably chooses those that are in accord with his Christian faith. He is perfectly aware of his procedure in such cases; indeed, he insists that faith and reason must join. Religious knowledge and scientific knowledge are two phases of one and the same act of complete knowledge: the only one capable of embracing the past and the future of evolution so as adequately to contemplate and evaluate them.

# The Christian Phenomenon

He finds his justification in what he aptly calls the Christian phenomenon. "The Christian fact stands before us. It has its place among the other realities of the world." That fact may not be overlooked by any thinking man who seeks to understand the universe. The reality of Christianity is recognized in the force it has been able to exert among men. It addresses itself to every man of every class, and from the very outset took its place as one of the most vigorous and fruitful currents ever found in the "noosphere" (the thinking layer of the earth). Even more than a quantitative value of life, as measured by its world-wide action, it is a qualitative value expressing itself, in the manner of all biological progress, by the appearance of a new state of consciousness, Christian love.

This is the phenomenon which is so important for the science of man: in every corner of the earth a zone of thought has emerged in which

universal love is operative. Far from slowing down, the movement seems, even when viewed dispassionately from without, to be gaining in acceleration and intensity.

Although uncongenial to some ancient religions, immersed as they are in untenable myths or in a pessimistic and passive mysticism, evolution as conceived by Teilhard is capable of promoting Christianity; for it offers the Christian a magnificent means of feeling more at home with God, and of giving himself more completely to Him. In its trend toward a conscious synthesis founded on love, Christianity is moving toward the spiritual and transcendent pole of universal convergence, the Omega Point.

All this can be divined by the scientific observer. Supernaturally, in a way that escapes natural observation, the unitive contact of man with God reaches a super-intimacy brought about by grace. Thus we can say that the Christian faith is destined, and is preparing, to save and even to take the place of evolu-

tion.

Various reasons have been assigned to account for the attractiveness of Teilhard's works, especially of The Phenomenon of Man. His success is attributed to his spirited optimism, his assurance, welcomed by a world fearful of further wars. that men are tending to unite. Perhaps, too, many people are tiring of the pessimism of some contemporary existentialist philosophies, and gladly embrace the suggestion that present fright and evil may be no more than the birth-pangs of a new and happier world. For those who are surfeited with materialism, the prospect that mankind is oriented toward spirit offers hope. Such reasons seem to be quite valid. To them must be added the satisfaction found in a skillfully wrought synthesis that makes the universe intel-

ligible.

The Christian cannot but experience exaltation at the thought of the magnificent harmony prevailing between Teilhard's scientific depiction of the world's movement and the deepest convictions of his faith. The theologian, who knows that the power to save cannot be lodged in any human or cosmic force, can derive inspiration from the perspective that the universe is rising toward greater consciousness and unity, a movement utilized by God for man's supernatural salvation and the preparation of His Kingdom. Even the non-Christian, though aware that Teilhard is discovering rather than demonstrating, must be impressed with the description of the intelligible movement of the world that implies the existence of God, and may well ask himself if he is not here confronted with reality and truth.

# Flaws in Teilhard's Work

No man's work is perfect, and critics have not been reluctant to point out flaws in Teilhard's book. One of the more serious of these is the omission of the production of material being by creation. Through the book, creation is scarely mentioned; the beginning of things is

passed over in silence. It could be said, in his defence, that he could not, while remaining on the plane of science, prove anything about the absolute beginning of things. Philosophically, as St. Thomas argued in seven of his major works, creation in time cannot be demonstrated. There is no inherent contradiction in the idea of creation from all eternity. It may also be said that Teilhard is concerned with the unitive rather than the creative aspect of divine activity. God is constantly presented as the goal of an ascensional motion. Teilhard, however, writes not only as a scientist but as a Christian. And hence it remains a very valid criticism that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to square some of his hypotheses with Christian Revelation.

Teilhard has also been justifiably criticized as over-oblivious of sin. Where he speaks of evil towards the end of the book, he seems to be answering an objection, and even there his references are more to physical than to moral evil. Again it could be said that, while, as a scientist, he could hardly have been expected to draw out the dogma of original sin, he does allow for it: the quantity of malice and evil in the world appears excessive and inexplicable unless some extraordinary catastrophe or primordial deviation has interfered with the normal course of evolution. Phenomenon leaves much to theology, which must add depth and precision to the findings and suggestions furnished by experience. But although the doctrines of sin and redemption are not incompatible with his teaching, the criticism is valid.

In addition to preserving awareness of the phenomenological plane of the exposition, the reader must remember that Teilhard speaks his own language and uses or even invents his own terminology, which are definitely not those of theology or scholastic philosophy. (It is easy to understand why seminary students have been directed not to read the book except under competent guidance.) At all events, the book should not be begun unless it is

read through to the end. What the author writes in the Epilogue, the Postscript and the Appendix, brings out the value of the work and contributes intelligibility to all the previous development. The scientist is a Christian throughout, and his knowledge of Catholic dogma guided his scientific efforts. So perfectly and exactly does God, Center of centers, coincide with the Omega Point that Teilhard, as he says in all honesty, would not have formulated his hypothesis if he had not found, in his consciousness as a believer, not only its speculative model, but its living reality.

# -Catholics and Unions-

There are very many Catholics with a strong anti-union bias. The basis of this bias differs with various classes. The average graduate of a Catholic school knows little of the social doctrine of the Church and less about its specific teaching relative to unions. What knowledge they acquire after graduation is usually determined by the position they have in the occupational hierarchy, or by what they read in the generally hostile accounts of union activity in newspapers and magazines. In the case of Catholic employers, it too often happens that they are either ignorant of or simply reject the Church's guidance in social matters, and specifically as regards unions. It is not at all uncommon that Catholic employers are as bitterly anti-union as non-Catholics who lack the directive norms of the Church. In other words, most Catholic businessmen accept the basic tenets of economic liberalism and look on labor unions as "an intrusion on the sacred prerogatives of management."-From Christ's Blueprint FOR THE SOUTH, May, 1960.

# -How to Raise a Delinquent-

 Begin with infancy to give the child everything he wants. In this way he will grow up believing the world owes him a living.

2. When he picks up "bad" words or "dirty" words, laugh at him. That will make him think he is "cute." He will run off and pick

up some other words that will blow the top off your head.

3. Never give him any spiritual training until he is twenty-one, and then let him decide for himself. By the same logic, never teach him the English language. Maybe when he is old enough he will want to speak Bantu.

4. Praise him in his presence to all the neighbors; show how much

smarter he is than the neighbors' children.

5. Avoid the use of the word "wrong." It may develop in the child a "guilt complex." This will prepare him to believe that when he is punished later on for stealing cars or assaulting women that society is "against him" and that he is being "persecuted."

6. Pick up everything after him: his shoes, his books, his clothes. Do everything for him, so that he will be experienced in throwing

burdens on others.

7. Let him read anything he wants. Have no concern whatever for what goes into his mind. Provide him with Lily Cups for his lips, but let his brain drink out of any dirty container for words and ideas.

8. Quarrel frequently in the presence of your children. In this way

they will be prepared for broken homes later on.

9. Give him all the spending money he wants; never let him earn his own.

10. Satisfy every craving of the child for food, drinks and everything that has to do with the sense of taste and touch, gratifying every sensual desire.

11. Take his part against policemen, teachers and neighbors. They

are all "prejudiced" against your child.

12. When he gets into real trouble, always defend yourself and say, "I never could do anything with him."—Rules drawn up by the POLICE DEPARTMENT, Houston, Texas, and distributed to the parents of children who run afoul of the law.

If we are to preach the Christian message, our approach must be as unique as the faith we represent. Our aim must be integrated Christian teaching. It is not enough to report incidents and happenings that bear upon the externals of religion.

# The Truth in Charity'

MOST REV. PATRICK A. O'BOYLE Archbishop of Washington

My speech and my preaching were not in the persuasive words of wisdom, but in the demonstration of the Spirit and of power, that your faith might rest, not on the wisdom of men, but on the power of God (I Cor. 2:4, 5).

WHEN God in His infinite wisdom sought out Saul, the persecutor, to make him Paul, the apostle and teacher of the nations, He

followed a pattern that was highly symbolic. Christ appeared to him on the road to Damascus. As a result of this vision, Saul was blinded. Only upon his appeal to the early Church, as instructed by the Saviour, did his sight return. In a dramatic fashion he learned that faith is a passage from darkness to light.

The symbolism of this incident must have burned deeply into the soul of St. Paul, for time and again

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>e</sup>A sermon delivered to the Catholic Press Association convention delegates, National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1960.

he contrasts the wisdom of the Gospel with the wisdom of the world. When he preached Christ crucified, it was foolishness to the world. But to those that were called, it was the power and wisdom of God. He wrote, "The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men" (I Cor. 1:25). St. Paul emphasized that the unique contribution of the Christian message is so transcendent that anything else seems almost nothing by comparison.

In this approach, we find a profound lesson for the Catholic press. Your association is now 50 years old. Its record of achievement is outstanding. What is particularly gratifying is the fact that it is not content to rest upon its laurels. It is constantly searching to improve what is good, to correct what may be deficient or outdated. "Forgetting what is behind, I strain forward to what is before, I press on towards the goal, to the prize of God's heavenly call in Christ Jesus" (Phil. 3:14).

If we are to preach the Christian message, our approach must be as unique as the faith we represent. Our aim must be integrated Christian teaching. It is not enough to report incidents and happenings that bear upon the externals of religion. We are not just a medium to record what has happened and to announce what is planned. The very life of the Church and the shining truth of our faith must be reflected in our pages.

Our theme might well be, in the words of His Holiness Pope John

XXIII, to speak the truth in charity. "Go forth and teach all nations" (Matt. 28:19). To speak the truth in season and out of season (II Tim. 4:2), to witness the sublime message of the Gospel, to be the light of the world, a city set upon a mountain (Matt. 5:14, 15), this is the teaching mission of the Church. And our press has been delegated to share in this mission.

# The Truth We Preach

The truth we preach should be the entirety of the moral law. At times we have been criticized for the narrowness of our interest. Some say that we are concerned mostly with the institutional interests of the Church and certain obvious segments of the moral law. It is charged that we are preoccupied with communism, divorce, birth control, indecent literature, and similar readily identifiable evils. But we are alleged to be less interested in other problems such as civic corruption, racial discrimination, the festering sores of city slums, the plight of the immigrant and the refugee, and the needs of hungry people elsewhere in the world.

To the extent that there is truth in these charges, we should be anxious to broaden our concern for the moral law. I recognize that certain types of moral truths are easier to treat than others. Communist persecution of the Church, for example, is so obviously wrong that no sensible person would question our position on it. By contrast, while the evils fostered by city slums are

equally clear, it is often difficult to determine proper remedies.

Such difficulties are inherent in any application of moral principles to complex issues of the temporal order. To apply principles wisely, three conditions must be present. We must know all the moral principles involved. We can fall into dangerous oversimplification if we seize only upon obvious principles and neglect others that may be equally pertinent. Next, we must have a competent and balanced grasp of the facts involved. Sound moral principles can be wrongly applied when we have inadequate factual knowledge of a given problem.

Finally, we need to exercise the virtue of prudence in seeking remedies for the evil in question. Prudence involves reasonable judgment in the light of all the available alternatives. It is no help to come up with a solution that seems ideal in the abstract, but which is ill-suited to the concrete case before us.

When moral principles are applied to complex issues of the temporal order, it is not unusual that men of good will disagree. For example, I doubt that everyone interested in the cause of racial justice agrees on certain tactics used to obtain this end. Yet it is most unjust to impugn the motives of good men when actually we only disagree with their judgment. In the words of Pope Pius XII, in the Catholic press "no one will condemn another because he does not agree with his opinion, much less challenge his loyalty."

One of the most delicate problems

we face today is our judgment on controversies involving the Catholic Church. For reasons well known to all of us, much is being said today about the status of the Church in American society. It would be a mistake were we to react to such discussions in a short-sighted manner. The temptation will be great to treat such issues in the immediate context of the moment. We could devote all our attention to the one question of the political rights of Catholics in our democracy.

To take such a narrow viewpoint would be to miss an opportunity for important long-range gains. Even though some of our critics give evidence of prejudice, we must always remember that our reactions will be observed by a much wider circle of readers. We can win a battle and lose a war. We can score a point in partisan controversy, and yet alienate others by our lack of moderation and humility.

Issues far broader and more vital than political controversy have put the spotlight on the Church today. The forthcoming ecumenical council, and the appeal of the Holy Father for Christian unity, have focused attention upon the Church throughout the world. Searching questions will be asked. Accusations will be made. Unsavory points of history, both ancient and contemporary, will be paraded before the public eye. Even though some who criticize give evidence of bad faith, it would be a disastrous error to assume that every inquirer or critic is so motivated.

As confession of sin is good for

the soul, the public acknowledgment of error is a powerful force for winning critics. Our Holy Father has repeatedly asked proponents of Christian unity to approach this problem in humility and charity. He asks that we be more ready to confess our own mistakes than to seek out the faults of others. Surely this is the approach that harmonizes best with the spirit of the Gospels and Epistles. Arrogance repels. Humility attracts.

At all times, we should speak in charity. St. Paul tells us that "Charity is patient, is kind; . . . thinks no evil; does not rejoice over wickedness, but rejoices with the truth; bears with all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things . . ." (I Cor. 13:4-7).

In the same vein, Pope John was speaking in this spirit in his recent talk to the Lenten preachers of Rome. He warned them to treat evil infrequently, to mention it once or twice when necessary, but to dwell upon virtue and goodness. We are to be sparing with truths that wound, and generous with those that heal. Denunciation may be needed on rare occasions, but encouragement is always welcomed. How often our Lord spoke of mercy-"Blessed are the merciful," "I will have mercy and not sacrifice." How infrequently did He condemn!

Some may object that this is a soft and easy Christianity. But the Gospels are not soft. Those who would follow Christ must take up their cross daily. They are disciples of one who had not whereon to lay

His head. They are the seed that must die to live. They must expect persecution and exile. And in all this they must have the courage to say: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

The explanation of this paradox is both simple and profound. As we grow in love of the crucified Christ, we become ever more aware of our own sins, and ever more forgiving of the weaknesses of others. Our model is not the Pharisee, who recites his virtues and scorns others for their sins, but rather the Publican, whose sole prayer was: "Lord, be merciful to me, a sinner."

As we are sparing in condemnation, so likewise we are tolerant with those who disagree with us. This is true above all with those who are our brethren in the faith. When fellow Catholics hold opinions different from ours in matters that are not of faith, it may often be necessary to express our reasons for dissent. But we should never use the language of scorn and bitterness in defending our views.

We may have more than one occasion to ponder this message in the months to come, as attacks upon the Catholic Church in the United States become more frequent and violent. The temptation will be great to reply in kind, and to return insult for insult. These are the weapons of the world, and they have been used by kings and emperors whose kingdoms and empires crumbled into dust, as will the empire headed by the leader of godless communism. Yet the Church, with its martyrs and saints,

lives and thrives. And it is strongest when it relies upon the weapons of faith, and not upon the patronage and aid of the powerful of this earth.

It is not important to the Church that the symbols of secular power accrue to its sons. But it is vital that we so comport ourselves that the truth and vitality of our faith becomes evident to all. From this point of view, the humiliation of persecution, based on half-truths and all but forgotten lies, can be a blessing, if only we accept it in the spirit of Christ. Here is a real challenge to the Catholic press and to all our faithful.

If by our quiet dignity, our

charity, our compassion, our mercy, we give the lie to false charges against us, such attacks will boomerang upon those making them. Our manner of acting will be more eloquent than a thousand sermons in our search for unity of all Christians in truth. We can show that our only concern is for souls, and not political power or earthly riches.

These, then, are some of the implications of the theme of the Holy Father: to speak the truth in charity. In this way, we teach the fullness of our Faith. We preach the wisdom of the Spirit, not the wisdom of this world. Our light shall shine before men. They shall know the truth, the truth that makes men free.

# The National "Softness"

The debate gathering steam in the country today attests that we are becoming soft because of our passion for consumer goods and luxuries. Wherever else we are becoming soft, our heads must be included. For Americans, with 6.5 per cent of the world's population, have 41 per cent of its income; Asians make up 52 per cent of the world, yet receive only 11 per cent of the wealth. How long do we think we can get away with hogging the world's wealth? Our foreignaid program is a pittance compared to the need and our capacity to help; it doesn't even approach our annual per capita expenditure of \$56 on alcohol and \$36 on cigarettes. Before it is too late, we must help the peoples of Asia and Africa and Latin America obtain the justice they seek.—From the Sign, July, 1960.

A book is not necessarily immoral because it contains immoral actions or situations. It is immoral if those elements are used to give the over-all impression that immorality is to be excused, made little of or glamorized.

# Bad Morals, Good Books and Vice Versa\*

HAROLD C. GARDINER, S.J. Literary Editor, AMERICA

THE late beloved Father Daniel A. Lord, S.J., once wrote a pamphlet with the defiant-sounding title, I Can Read Anything. Father Lord was clearly not boasting that he himself was able to read anything, for I knew him well and I know that he could not read Arabic, for instance, or Chinese. What he suggested in the title and achieved in his inimitable style in the booklet was a discussion of the attitude of

many young people who were (and are) irked at the very thought that some reading material is "out of bounds" for them, who are inclined to rebel at any control of their reading, especially at controls, restrictions imposed by external authority as exercised by the home or the school.

Father Lord's booklet is clear, sane, understanding and persuasive, and I recommend it to all, especial-

<sup>\*</sup>Reprinted with permission from the Ave Maria, Notre Dame, Ind., May 7, 1960.

ly parents and teachers. But it is, unfortunately, hard to locate these many years after its publication, and so I am going to venture, at the request of Ave Maria's editor, to set forth as simply as I can some guidelines on the complex subject of art and morality.

What will be said in these columns will be, to a great extent, a summary of the much longer discussion on this subject to be found in the second and expanded edition of my Norms for the Novel (Hanover House). I am sorry that this has all the earmarks of a "commercial," but the subject is so important for those who have the responsibility of forming the character and tastes of young people that I sincerely trust that my readers will consider this article merely an introduction to a further study of the question.

Perhaps the best way to begin is by asking a simple-somewhat too simple-question: can bad morals make good books? To this the simple (too simple) answer is NO.

The reason is that all the components that go into the writing of a book are also the components that go into a judgment of that book. Those components are, to name a few, the story (plot), the shaping of characters, the style of the writing —and the total moral atmosphere. If a novel is bad morally, then the book is not only morally dangerous, but also artistically inferior, for the moral impact is no less a part of the artistic whole than the plot or the character realization.

But this question and answer only

open up the problem, for immediately we have to make a distinction. A book is not necessarily immoral just because it contains incidents or characters or situations that are immoral. The author can talk about immorality without having to be accused of writing an immoral book. You need not have read much literature to have come to this obvious conclusion. Most of the great literature of the world talks about actions or attitudes that are morally wrong -Shakespeare's tragedies, for instance, talk about murder, envy, ingratitude, marital infidelity, pride, dishonesty and so on. And I trust I shall not be misunderstood when I remark that even our Lord in His lovely parables talks about human actions that are morally wrong-remember the unjust steward who urged those who were in debt to his master to sit down and falsify their accounts? Or the prodigal son who dissipated his inheritance "living riotously"?

The reason why immoral actions (and don't think only of sex in this connection, as we are all too inclined to do) will almost inevitably have a place (and a legitimate place) in literature is the simple fact that most great, and even just good, novels and plays have as their central theme some conflict between right and wrong, good and evil, and if the conflict is to be convincing the immoral attitudes or deeds have to be presented as realistically as the good attitudes and actions with which they clash.

It is not, therefore, the mere pres-

ence of immorality in a story upon which we have to base our decision whether the book itself is or is not immoral. This decision will depend on the attitude toward immorality that motivates the author and comes through as a predominant impression on the reader. The immoral aspects will make the book immoral if the author gives the dominant impression that he condones, excuses, perhaps even admires and glorifies the immorality he found necessary to portray. Certainly Shakespeare was not excusing murder in Macbeth, or suggesting that we take his play as encouragement to indulge in a few murders ourselves. And certainly our Lord was not approving the riotous living of the prodigal son.

This is not merely an academic question. It is a key and most practical point in the guidance that parents and teachers can and must give to the young. Moreover, it is a question that pops up over and over again with modern novels—witness the exchange of letters in Ave Maria's correspondence columns over Albert Roth's What Is the Stars? and the heated criticism leveled on this score against Morris West's The

Devil's Advocate.

In each of these books the immoral situations, language, actions were not portrayed for the sake of excusing or approving, but because they were a necessary part of the total scene as conceived by the author. If young people are to grow to read the world's great literature in mature fashion, they have to be trained to realize the legitimate place

in books of the wrongdoing that must be handled if any virtue or nobility is to be seen in contrast.

# Guidance in Canon Law

This problem of striking a balanced judgment on the presence of immorality in a book and the overall moral or immoral impact of a book is admittedly a difficult one. But we have authoritative guidance in the comments of those canon lawyers who have discussed the sections of the Code of Canon Law that deal with the prohibition of books that are ex professo obsceni (professedly, or, we may say, explicitly, obscene).

A book, say these commentators, is not to be designated as obscene because of the presence of passages that deal with immoral actions. Whether or not a book is obscene has to be determined by the book's tota natura or tota indolis (its complete character or nature). So, for example, in the case of the notorious Lady Chatterley's Lover. The passages that describe immoral sexual relations are frequent enough, to be sure, to give the novel a definitely immoral atmosphere.

But more important is the book's justification of these actions. D. H. Lawrence, revolting quite properly against the dehumanization of life in a growing industrial civilization, believed that human love is the one force that can enable modern man to retain some vestiges of his shrinking humanity. But he runs to the extreme of preaching a gospel that human love is to be grasped and

treasured wherever it can be found—whether in or out of marriage. The immoral passages coalesce, as it were, into a philosophy of immorality, a defense of illicit love, and that is why the book is immoral, rather than because of the passages taken individually.

To give a contrasting example, the passages in Graham Green's The End of the Affair, in addition to the fact that they do not occur frequently, do not, I believe, add up to any open or even suggested defense of adultery. Quite the contrary: the immoral actions are the elements from which arises the conflict in which

the good prevails.

Young people can be taught to take this comprehensive view of the place of immorality in fiction. To isolate such passages and focus one's attention on them and consequently to judge the entire book in the light of such passages is more often than not to miss the whole meaning of the book. The fact that immature readers-immature either by reason of age or of lack of emotional development-do tend to isolate such passages and perhaps dwell on them betrays a fault in the reader, not necessarily a fault in the book. For the simple, if mysterious, fact of the matter is that a great author, and any good author, working honestly and with integrity and a sense of responsibility, can deal and often does deal with immoral actions or situations, but he deals with them morally.

The reader has a responsibility, too, and it consists in placing these immoral aspects within the framework the author has constructed. There is a creative reading as well as a creative writing, and it is the function of those who mold the young to lead them to recognize immorality when it is present, but not to give it undue or exaggerated em-

phasis or importance.

It is also quite true that an author, in one detailed description of immorality, especially in sexual matters, can paint a picture so vivid that it haunts the memory and the imagination. Even so, though the author may lay himself open to the legitimate charge that he has been imprudent or careless, a single passage is not enough to force us to condemn the whole book as obscene. Such a passage may well justify parents and teachers in keeping the book from the impressionable, but it does not justify an accusation that the reviewer has been recommending a "dirty" book.

Too often the reader of reviews, in the Ave Maria and other Catholic media, demands that the reviewer have but two phrases in his critical vocabulary: "I condemn" or "I recommend." This is to demand of the reviewer an infallibility he does not possess. It is also to shirk the responsibility that any reader must bring to his own reading. For the reviewer cannot read the book with your reactions, your temperament, your conscience. He must read with own temperament and conscience and trust that his reactions will serve to help you read the book as he thinks it ought to be read. You

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may disagree with the reviewer (how often have I been disagreed with!) but that gives you no franchise to accuse the reviewer of moral laxity.

## "Four-letter Words"

A corollary at once comes to mind. If its bare statement seems shocking, I hope readers will think along with me as I try to explain it. Many who deal with the young feel strongly that the mere presence of vulgar language-the notorious "fourletter words"-is enough to make a book immoral. That is not true. Such words are frowned upon in normal 20th-century American society because the use of them violates conventions. Chaucer and Shakespeare used similar expressions quite freely and normally, and the 22nd century may swing back to such a frequent and accepted usage.

I am by no means advocating that young people-or anybody else, for that matter-be encouraged in the use of such language, but I am stating that young readers have to be taught to be able to take such phrases in stride, as it were, when they encounter them in their reading, just as they take them in stride when they may chance to overhear them on the streets. To attach undue importance to them in a book, to hint or protest that they are of themselves indecent or obscene, is to invest them with a moral menace they do not have and thereby to make them to the young mind an occasion of sin, which they are not of themselves. In other words, false guidance in this matter is an easy way to form false consciences.

It may well be that many a parent and teacher feels that books sprinkled with this vulgar and uncouth language are simply not to be tolerated as reading for anyone, but especially for the young. Well and good: parents and teachers will be acting within their proper authority if they forbid the reading of such books. But the prohibition must rest on the proper reason: the books are forbidden not because the language makes them immoral (and the reading of them sinful), but because it is not desirable for the young to be unduly exposed to such crudities. Young people are, of course, exposed to these facets of life, more frequently than teachers and parents realize. They are exposed through overheard conversations, perhaps from the talk of their companions, and it is at least a possibility that if they learn how to judge such language in books, they will be equipped to handle it in real life.

Above all, perhaps, parents and teachers should be extremely loath to accuse a reviewer, especially in a Catholic journal, of "recommending immoral books," if the reviewer, while properly adverting to the low language, still judges that the book is worthy of the attention of the mature reader. If the reader has been alerted to the language, then he ought to know-if he knows himself at all-whether he would care to read the book. He has no right at all to accuse others who read the

book of immoral reading.

This brings us to a final and most important point in our consideration. It is this: not every good book is ipso facto for everybody's reading.

This is so because the temperaments and reactions of individuals differ, precisely because they are individuals. A book that may occasion absolutely no worry, disturbance or dimming of ideals for one reader may cause another reader a feeling of unease as he reads, even to such an extent that he realizes that his own conscience is telling him to put the book down. Here is where the immensely delicate but wonderfully rewarding opportunity of personal guidance comes into play. A parent ought to know the children well enough to be able to say that whereas Mary Jane can properly and profitably read, let us say, The Devil's Advocate, John Peter is not yet ready for this type of adult novel.

This problem is more difficult for the teacher because of the numbers of the young readers. But unless our Catholic schools have lost all concept of individual guidance and training, the teacher ought to know the students well enough to be able to adapt reading to the individual need, capabilities and preparedness of the pupil. This may frequently mean that a certain book will be distributed with care; it does not mean that pages have to be ripped out or whole volumes heaved into the fur-

Perhaps all the above may be summarized in three "rules" for the evaluation of morality and art (here books):

1) A book is not necessarily immoral because it contains immoral actions or situations. It is immoral if these elements are used to give the over-all impression that immorality is to be excused, made little of,

defended or glamorized.

2) The use of vulgar language (the "four-letter words") does not necessarily constitute immorality. Such usage is generally a violation of good taste, not an infringement of the moral code. It may be a violation of that code if it is employed (frequently the case) in conjunction with a belittling of morality.

Though some few books publicized every year are quite openly immoral, the vast majority of books must be judged for their suitability to the individual reader. This is true for all readers, but applies with special pertinence to the young in their

formation of reading habits.

To demand that every book 1) contain absolutely no immoral actions or situations, 2) be written in the most delicate, polite and socially acceptable language, and 3) be utterly suitable to all readers, of whatever age, maturity or background would mean 1) that most of the acknowledged great literature of the world would have to be junked, and 2) that all books written in the future be on the level of Black Beauty or Little Women.

If that ever happens (don't fear, or hope-it won't), then the title of Father Lord's booklet would be true in a sense he never intended-anvbody could read anything.

But who would want to?

Fear blinds the neutralist intellectual to his own best interests; pettiness robs him of courage; pride compels him to cloak both in the mantle of high, noble motives. All he can offer civilization is the whimpering counsel of despair and abandonment.

## What Price Freedom?

SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

ON THURSDAY of this week, during debate on the Senate Floor, I had occasion to refer to the Pulitzer prize-winning novel "Advise and Consent," which pictures an America of a few years hence, an America in which demagogues can inflame huge gatherings and bring them to their feet cheering with the slogan, "I would rather crawl to Moscow on my hands and knees than be killed by an atomic bomb."

Should this book prove prophetic,

it will mean that our people have rejected the choice between liberty and death made by Patrick Henry and the founding fathers, the choice which drew the cheers of America from 1775 down to the recent past.

The fundamental question before the United States and our Free World allies in the coming decade is this: Do we value our free civilization enough to run all the risks and meet all the challenges which the Communists will force upon us in

<sup>•</sup>An address at the Convocation of the Freedom Institute, St. John's University, N.Y., N.Y., May 14, 1960.

the years ahead? It is in the context of this question that I would like to discuss the subject that has been assigned to me today—"Political freedom under a representative government and in a totalitarian state."

I do not think it likely that an ignoble surrender policy will ever be publicly proclaimed by high American officials as their political platform. Men and nations have frequently betrayed their best interests through fear but they have generally rationalized and disguised their cowardice and not publicly proclaimed it. Surrender, if it comes, will probably come in more subtle ways, but the end result will be the same. We need not look, therefore, for base pronouncements. We must seek out the trend in less obvious signs and guises. And such signs are not wanting.

When the preservation of freedom in West Berlin appeared to run serious risk of war a year ago, there was no dearth of advocates, at home and abroad, for a policy of concession and retreat that would temporarily avoid risk of war at the probable cost of freedom for West

Berlin.

There is today a rapidly growing movement, well organized, well represented in the press, movies and TV, in the scientific community and in government, people so fearful of the risks of the cold war that they are willing to accept nuclear disarmament on almost any terms, with or without an adequate system of detection and enforcement. These people are not concerned that this

could condemn the United States to a military inferiority which would make our eventual surrender or destruction inevitable. They are concerned only with their fears of the present.

And then we have the school of British intellectuals now openly advocating what our own "softies" have heretofore kept below the surface. This group, headed by Lord Bertrand Russell and Philip Toynbee, believes that we must give up nuclear weapons now to assure that they will never be used against us; that we should seek the best terms from the Soviets we can get. But, if they should be totally intransigent, we should give up nuclear weapons anyway, and submit to Communist control as a preferable alternative to carrying on the present struggle that might lead to nuclear war.

Toynbee states the basic philosophy of this group in the following sentence: "In the terrible context of nuclear war, even the vital differences between communism and Western freedom become almost unimportant."

Almost unimportant! This is the neutralist intellectual's equivalent of, "I would rather crawl to Moscow on my hands and knees than be killed by an atomic bomb." It does not matter to these people that, by building our strength, we maintain a good chance of preserving both our lives and our freedom. It does not matter that the blood bath which historically follows every Communist seizure might take more lives than the A-Bomb. It does not

matter that the existence they purchased by surrender would be only the exploited existence of a Communist slave. It matters only that the element of risk is large, and that, to them, any considerable risk to existence is a greater evil than the loss of Christian civilization. They are so overwhelmed at the horror of nuclear destruction that all other values are for them already destroyed and are rendered relatively meaningless.

Whether this neutralist philosophy will remain an isolated view held by an insignificant group, manifesting itself infrequently in test-ban rallies or in occasional picketing of Downing Street and the White House; or whether this poisonous creed will seep into the marrow of our national bone structure and paralyze us, will depend upon whether our people really understand, or can be brought to understand, what the loss of national freedom and subjection to Communist tyranny would mean.

## Two Basic Replies

There are two basic replies to the neutralist position. The first is that we can avoid both catastrophes, nuclear war and enslavement, by remaining militarily strong and standing firm against aggression. This is a potent argument. It is a tangible argument. It is a demonstrable argument that has thus far worked. It is the basis of our national policy. It has been exhaustively debated, its tenets are widely known and I therefore forego discussion of it today, in favor of the second argu-

ment against neutralism, which is less understood and little discussed.

This argument maintains that the political destruction of Western civilization and its system of free institutions constitutes a death for its people and its nations just as violent, just as hideous, just as final as nuclear destruction itself, that there is little to choose between nuclear physical destruction and Communist political destruction.

The detailed knowledge of communism in all its aspects is available, indeed it is abundant. But the evil of communism is so alien, so appalling, so far removed from anything in our own experience, that our intellectuals and our people

ignore the evidence.

By and large, men believe what they are prepared to believe, what is familiar to them, what jibes with their own experience. We ignore the clear 'signs in order to retain our familiar conceptions. We shield our eyes from the reality of communism or we lack the intellectual curiosity to inquire into it.

On the supernatural level, we have read in the lives of the saints of occasions when they were granted visions of human evil as God sees it, and the sight of this evil in its true light was so loathsome, so horrible that they felt they would die were the visions not instantly withdrawn. And ever after they would die rather than commit evil.

So on the natural level, a true picture of atheistic communism would so repel the freedom-loving peoples of the world could they but see it, that they would risk all that they have to defend themselves and their posterity against it. Our task is to bring this picture before them in

every way we can.

It is a relatively easy thing to imagine the horrors of physical destruction brought on by a nuclear attack. It seems a difficult thing for people to understand the meaning of the political, moral and social destruction that is involved in the communization of the civilized world. We cannot even grasp the full extent of it by looking at what the Communists have done already in the areas they control. For they have been unable to completely work their will on their subject peoples.

The existence of a great and powerful free community exercises a restraint upon them. The public remembrance of the old order still limits them. The need to concede some things to the wishes of their subjects still restrains them. Should they conquer the world, and thus gain complete security, they could work their terrible will unrestrained and put into total practice their dialectic which is as yet only half realized.

Professor Gerhart Neimeyer of Notre Dame University has described the meaning of Communist rule in a

pearing in Modern Age.

At one point Dr. Neimeyer says:

brilliant essay, a classic, recently ap-

Communism is destructive with a novel quality, not mere injustice or mere unfreedom, but the ravaging of the reality of human life by the spirit of dogmatized unreality. Western intellectuals understand the danger of material destruction, which is, after all, simple and obvious. The quality of communism's destructiveness has so far escaped their grasp. To understand it, one must get oneself to enter a mental world of distortion, reason perverted with the aid of force, half truth set up as dogma, deceit espoused as norm.

## Communist Design

If the Communists sought only to rule the world, then the danger could be judged in the same light as that of previous aggressive tyrannies. But they want more than to rule the world. They want to destroy it and remake it in the image of their insane dogma.

To the Communist, everything that we hold to be true is false. Our ideals, values, customs, loyalties are to him parts of an ugly system he is determined to destroy. Our concepts of God, the individual, the family, truth, love, freedom, justice are to him objects of hatred and

derision. But our world haunts him. He cannot be content just to deride us and wait for our demise. If our truths are real, then his life is a senseless nightmare. He must banish our values to vindicate his own. In the long run, therefore, our death becomes essential to his life. He is locked tight in an irrational system which admits of no truth or standard of measurement outside its own dialectic. To the extent that he is a Communist, he abhors the non-Communist world and is compelled to work for its destruction. To the extent that he is a Communist, he can know no peace. He is driven on by a desperate inner compulsion toward the destruction of the existing world order. The only priority ahead of the destruction of our system is the building and preservation of his own. The only restraints upon his designs against us are his fears for the safety of his own system.

The threat of Communist subjugation, therefore, differs from the threat of all previous attempts to conquer the world. Here is no tyranny which seeks domination only for the sake of power, or spoils, or exploitation, or even the gratification of limitless ambition. Here is a depraved Samson which seeks to pull down the pillars of the present world, and raise in its place a structure such as man has never seen. How would our lives be changed should the Communists achieve world domination? What would Communist rule mean in America?

The revealed truths of religion would be thoroughly and systematically stamped out. Religious instruction and services, the sacraments, the means of grace which we hold to be essential for the salvation of the human soul, would be made as unavailable as perverted man can make them. Knowledge of the true goal of our existence, eternal life, would be erased insofar as it is possible for it to be erased. The concept of private property, around which so much of our daily life revolves, would be swept away. The fabric of free choice, through which we shape our lives by thousands of our decisions, would be unraveled. Family life as we know it would disappear. Our free associations would be gone. Pride of country, respect for law, satisfaction with our basic political and social order, all of which so much conditions our habitual attitudes, our character, our personality—all this would vanish.

Every aspect of our lives, from the sublime to the ridiculous, would be swept away and in its place erected the insane, irrational, antihuman regimentation of every phase of life, which requires not mere submission to evil but active participation in it. Again to quote Dr. Neimeyer:

Their rule is "not of this world," not of the world of present reality, but of the unreality of speculative fiction. That is why their hostility to the "presentday" world is so unrelenting. That is why they impose their party line not merely to secure their power, but to combat the expressions of the "presentday" world in art, poetry, music, philosophy, and religion. That is why they are never contented with mere compliance under their rule, but always seek to break their victim's mind from the world of common humanity, to attach it to the cause of the dialectic future, to bring about its inner transformation by means of "self-criticism" or public confession. That is why they cannot stop lecturing even to their life-long enemies in the inhuman setting of the prison camps. That is why there can be for them no truth, ethics, wisdom, save in the party's will, why every act of the party's power is to them "hallowed" through its service to the dialectic of history. And that is why Communists, in their relations with men and women of the "present-day" world can never achieve peace, no matter how strong a structure of power they erect.

For the existence that we have known, Communist rule would mean a death as final as the grave. And our despair would be magnified by the sight of our children and grand-children born into and growing up in a world alien to everything once cherished—a world of darkness, a world without faith, a world dead to either temporal or eternal realities.

This is the fate which the avantgarde of the neutralists is willing to accept now if they can thereby purchase the guarantee that there will be no war; death of the soul, death of the spirit, death of the heart, if only the body is permitted to live.

## Meaning of Freedom

Failure to understand the evil of communism is only half of our problem. The other half is that so many free people do not understand the meaning of government in their lives, nor the significance of freedom.

They tend to downgrade the importance of our political structure. They tend to think that we work out our destiny, our happiness in the private sphere of life and that the public sphere provides only utilities, peripheral benefits, law, order, safety. They think that a change of government, or a new system of government, might cause some distress, some inconvenience but it would not reach the heart of our existence, it need not intrude upon the inner sanctum of our lives.

Many of our people regard gov-

ernment as a nuisance, a game of spoils for politicans, a butt for jokes. Many think that whatever degree of contentment and happiness they have achieved has come about independently of, or in spite of, our political institutions rather than in large measure because of them.

These assumptions are tragically erroneous. The extent to which our lives are influenced by public institutions is difficult to exaggerate. Our education, our development, our ideas, goals, hopes are all heavily influenced by a variety of public institutions. These institutions reflect the basic ideas of our people about God, about the nature of life, the destiny of mankind, the way that life should be lived.

Our public institutions determine whether our home is our refuge or a mere extension of the state; whether we live with our neighbors comfortably as with friends, or fearfully as with spies; whether we raise our children according to our lights, or surrender them to the state; whether we are free to work out a private life of our own making, or have no private life, but only a public existence ordered to serve the all-consuming demands of the state.

If our public institutions reflect our religious, ethical and social ideals, our personal growth can take place with a certain harmony. If they do not, we are at best dogged with doubt and confusion, and at worst reduced to hopeless frustration and neurotic helplessness. If there are no religious or ethical convictions reflected in public institutions, but only a ruthless program to exterminate them and replace them with false gods and distorted truth, then the purpose of human life is so frustrated, the goal of life is so obscured, that it is really dehumanized.

And so the uprooting of public order, the destruction of this system of free institutions and its replacement with an order which is totally alien would wholly destroy our mode of existence as we have known it. This is a death as real as physical death itself.

And as the public framework is pulled down, as the churches are destroyed, as our ideals are uprooted, as human knowledge of God and His revelation is blotted out, as all the moral refinements and elevations of human nature wrought by thousands of years of our Judeo-Christian heritage are eroded away, our descendants may be condemned to a death infinitely more final than physical death, for we leave to them a world without the instruction, the aids, the instruments of grace which are necessary to man's eternal salvation.

That is the argument that I would make to the neutralist intellectual. But I would make it with scant hope of success for in many ways he is little better than the Communist. He is the lukewarm, for whom Christ reserved perhaps the most severe condemnation of the New Testament. Convinced that there are no moral absolutes, he can wholly commit himself to nothing and he finds

nothing worth suffering greatly for or giving his life for. Convinced that there is no life beyond the grave, animal survival is to him the ultimate reality. Fear blinds him to his own best interests; pettiness robs him of the magnanimous courage to risk all for the sake of posterity; pride compels him to cloak his fear in a mantle of high, noble motives.

Only history can tell how much of our intellectual community deserves this description. We may fervently hope the portion is small. Any philosophy or political program which aims at the avoidance of death or destruction is foredoomed to failure. Death, in the end, comes to all men and destruction comes upon all material things. In the century-old words of Cardinal Newman: "The world passes, the lofty palace crumbles, the busy city is mute, the ships of Tarshish are sped away; death comes upon the heart and the flesh. The veil is breaking." It is not the circumstance of death. but the moral quality of life that has eternal significance.

Let our people live, and if need be die, in defense of our faith, our freedom and our country, confident that our individual destiny and the survival of our race is yet in the hands of Divine Providence, a Providence which, if we but act our part with courage and loyalty, may yet ordain for us and our children a full, natural life in a world in which the peace of a just political and moral order is extended to all peoples.

Advances in our knowledge of the physiology of reproduction present various possibilities for the medically effective and moral regulation of fertility.

# Medical Research and Fertility Control

WILLIAM J. GIBBONS, S.J.

RECURRING mention of a "contraceptive pill" highlights the fact that modern man has it within his power to control fertility physiologically. This is not an entirely new discovery. Primitive tribes and prescientific peoples long ago claimed that certain herbs and roots help or hinder pregnancy. Seemingly, at least a few of them understood the female cycle sufficiently to space conceptions naturally—we call it

rhythm—with some degree of success. What makes contemporary research in fertility and its regulation specially significant is the scientific checking of hypotheses and findings at every step. There is little of the folkloric about it—unless it be an assumption of some that a "pill" can resolve most problems of family life.

It is noteworthy that physiologic control raises serious moral issues, not all of them readily answered.

<sup>\*</sup>Reprinted with permission from the Catholic World, 180 Varick St., New York 14, N.Y., May 1960.

Meanwhile, some are advocating widespread diffusion of fertility-controlling drugs or serums without due concern for ethical aspects of their use. Others react by suggesting that most research on fertility is morally suspect, and that we had better forget this whole area of inquiry. But there is little likelihood such research will cease. In any case, many of the findings are capable of legitimate applications. So an objective, if brief, look at the principal trends is in order.

Modern science has demonstrated that various drugs and serums can halt or modify the flow of internal secretion in such a way as to hasten or retard egg-formation (ovulation) in the female and sperm-formation (spermatogenesis) in the male. Certain compounds can be used to support a pregnancy and forestall spontaneous abortion, as well as to suppress ovulation. Also, researchers have been seeking other factors which so affect enzyme action or metabolism that fertilization is impeded, or the development of a fetus stopped. Not all of these studies have proved fruitful scientifically, but the overall findings contribute significantly to our understanding of ovulation time and its manifestations. And tests are being developed to determine this quickly and simply. These may have great impact on the effectiveness of periodic continence.

The Church's pressing concern in the matter of fertility regulation is that the ends of marriage, as traditionally defined, be not confused or

distorted. She does not wish to see sexual expression regarded as an independent good unrelated to the procreation and rearing of offspring. In his Address to the Midwives (Oct. 29, 1951) and in his Address to "The Family Front" (Nov. 26, 1951), Pius XII stressed that those who habitually use their marital rights may not avoid arbitrarily and without reason, the normal outcome of the conjugal relationship. To do this, he said, is to sin against the purpose and meaning of marriage. He was quick to add, however, that reasons can exist for delaying the advent of children, and that these reasons might, in particular circumstances, persist for the duration of the marriage.

Now obviously, the late Pope was not counseling childless marriages. His words indicate this. Moreover, on several occasions he expressed sympathy for the involuntarily childless, and while condemning donor insemination as an answer to their problem, suggested that licit ways of helping such couples are known to medical science. But as an informed pastor of souls, he also realized that in an era of low infant and child mortality, not a few spouses are overly burdened by excessive fertility. Because of modern health measures, more children survive than did previously, and this is rapidly becoming a world-wide phenomenon.

Hence it comes to pass, that to use marriage while preserving the state of grace, couples may seek ways to avoid conception—when this is indicated—without violating God's law. The only alternative to this, or to larger families, is to abstain completely from sex relations within marriage, permanently or for protracted periods of time. As a general practice, there are psychological and pastoral arguments against that, although individual couples may find it the preferred solution to their problem.

Specifically, Pius XII mentioned reasons of a social, economic, medical, and eugenic character as justifying the delay or avoidance of conception. Competent moralists regard these headings as merely illustrative; other valid reasons may exist in particular situations. But even the general headings enumerated by the Pope cover a wide range of possibilities: some related to personal health, others to family finances, still others to the physical or spiritual welfare of prospective offspring.

Valid reasons, then, can exist for regulating family size by licit means. This is a common Catholic teaching, made explicit in our day as current problems of married couples receive more attention and the possibilities of periodic continence become better known. And these reasons need not be truly extraordinary, as some seem to imply. Nor do they depend for their validity upon resolution of abstruse questions regarding the world's ultimate productive potential and/or its spatial capacity. In the concrete, it suffices that a couple foresees genuine difficulties for themselves or others should pregnancy occur. Or they may anticipate legitimate benefits for family or society by avoiding conception. If doubts exist as to the sufficiency of the reason, or reasons, a confessor or spiritual guide should be consulted. And if, despite their plans and the validity of the reason, a conception occurs, then the strict duty to protect, rear and love the child is clear.

## Medical Research

Medical and biochemical research has striven for decades to learn more of the physiology of reproduction. It did this with several purposes in view. There was the strictly scientific one of advancing human knowledge and finding answers to ageold questions. And there were practical ones-protecting pregnancy, correcting genital disorders, aiding the infertile, and discovering ways to regulate fertility. In recent years, the last-named motive has become prominent. But it should be remembered that not all fertility research has this aim, and that which has, need not necessarily be related to immoral procedures.

Research providing knowledge about periodic continence is a case in point. Back in the 1830's and 1840's, great progress occurred in physiology, and intensive studies were conducted on the phenomena of ovulation and menstruation. Prominent among the researchers were Felix Pouchet (1800-1872) and Theodor Bischoff (1807-1882). Both discovered much about the female reproductive cycle. Pouchet's monumental report (1847) noted in its conclusion that: 1) ova are devel-

oped and expelled independently of fecundation; 2) ova are extruded at definite periods, and periodicity is noticeable; and 3) in mammals, fecundation (fertilization) can occur only when the ovum meets with "seminal fluid" in the uterine canal.

To us these summary findings seem commonplace, but the reports of Bischoff and Pouchet meant much to their contemporaries.

Only a few years passed before the Sacred Penitentiary of the Holy See was asked (1853) whether it is

## -Those Anticontraceptive Laws

Two States, Massachusetts and Connecticut, have laws which forbid persons to use contraceptive devices or physicians to prescribe them. Both laws were passed by predominantly Protestant State legislatures at a time when Protestants quite unanimously held such practices immoral. In recent years, both laws have been challenged but have been preserved largely through Catholic support.

In 1958, the New Haven County Superior Court dismissed an action attacking the constitutionality of Connecticut's law against contraceptives and was upheld later by the State Court of Errors. Now, the case has been carried to the Federal Supreme Court.

Regardless of the Supreme Court's ruling, the Catholic Church will not change her judgment that the use of artificial contraceptives is contrary to both the natural law and the divine positive law. But this doesn't necessarily mean that the Church favors such laws as the one in question in Connecticut. Nowhere in the country has there ever been a Catholic attempt to put such laws on the books.

Moral theologians are agreed that a law which cannot be enforced is a bad law. And, in our opinion, a law forbidding the use of contraceptives is practically unenforceable. Also, as Pope Pius XII once pointed out: "The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot . . . be an ultimate norm of action. It must be subordinate to higher and more general norms, which in some circumstances permit, and even perhaps seem to indicate as the better policy, toleration of error . . . to promote a greater good."

Many non-Catholics believe that they can make use of contraceptive devices without violating any divine law. Moreover, many such persons feel a positive obligation to prevent conception of offspring for one reason or another. Obviously, then, laws such as the Connecticut law try to regulate conscience.

morally permissible for couples to confine relations to days thought to be infertile, provided they had reasons for this practice. The reply stated that such couples "should not be disturbed, so long as they do nothing to prevent conception."

Thus, we can see that practical application of the new theories about ovulation time was spreading among physicians and patients, and that moral questions concerning periodic continence were raised early.

During the remainder of the nine-

We would not say that the state never can pass laws such as this, but that it can be done only for the gravest of reasons and when the acts outlawed are manifestly against the common good. Error has no rights, it is true, but persons—or consciences—in error do.

From these considerations, we feel that a Catholic can justifiably favor repeal of the Connecticut and Massachusetts anticontraceptive laws, or breathe happily if they are declared unconstitutional. But, since this is a purely prudential judgment, not every Catholic would agree.

Perhaps some Catholics are in favor of such legislation. Undoubtedly, many Catholics will deplore any ruling of the Supreme Court that such laws are unconstitutional, if such is, indeed, the court's ruling. Perhaps they base their judgment on the constant exhortations of the recent Popes to Christianize society and our social institutions.

But our own feeling is that this type of law becomes meaningful only when society itself has first been Christianized. And it's quite debatable whether 20th-century America is Christian enough to benefit from such a law.

It's difficult to forecast just how the Supreme Court will decide on the issue. What is certain is only that it will arouse controversy. But let it be controversy marked not by emotion, but by wisdom. Ultimately the question is whether or not the Connecticut law impinges on constitutional rights.

There is a definite distinction between a moral judgment about the use of contraceptives and a prudential judgment about the wisdom of a law which forbids their use and dissemination of information about them. About the first, there is only one Catholic position; as to the second, there is no Catholic position, but only positions taken by individual Catholics.—John Maguire, C.S.C., in the Ave Maria, June 11, 1960.

teenth century, knowledge about the female cycle was advanced, and in part confused, by additional theories and discoveries. The names of Eduard Pflüger (1829-1910) and Carl Capellmann (1841-1898) are noteworthy from a Catholic viewpoint, since their ideas on the reproductive cycle greatly influenced moralists of the pre-World War I era. The conclusions drawn as to morality were basically correct, and in accord with a second reply of the Sacred Penitentiary (1880) on periodic continence, namely, that it is permissible, and may even be counseled, where reasons exist.

But the Pflüger-Capellmann medical theories led many astray in practice, since they suggested that fecundation is most probable during or immediately around menstruation. By the 1920's medical research had clarified many inexact ideas. But, even in the following decade, some Catholic criticism of periodic continence was based on earlier misunderstandings. Critics were skeptical of new clinical findings, recalling mistakes which previously raised doubts about the feasibility of the practice from a medical viewpoint.

By the end of World War Î, the relationship between ovulation and menstruation, in terms of time, had emerged sufficiently clear to suggest the utility of detailed studies on the fertile and infertile days. Working independently, Kyusaku Ogino (1881-

) of Japan and Hermann Knaus (1892- ) of Austria demonstrated clinically that ovulation commonly occurs toward the middle of an approximately 28-day cycle. They concluded that fecundation can be achieved, or conception avoided, by timing coitus accordingly. During these years and later, an American researcher, George Washington Corner (1889-), contributed significantly to the growing knowledge of the cycle. And Robert L. Dickinson was an early popularizer of the "safe period" as a key to conception control.

During the 1930's, various manuals and tables designed for married couples came into use. Two American Catholic names associated with developments at this time were Doctors James J. Walsh and Leo J. Latz. These and others sought to foster marital chastity by diverting spouses from marital abuses, and they saw the "rhythm" method as

one means to this end.

However, the problem of the "irregular" women remained considerable, so long as reliance was placed solely on calendars. The cycles of such women tend to vary in length, and it was found that often the preovulatory phases of the cycles do not fit neatly into a general pattern. Then, too, after pregnancy, even "regular" women found it might be several months before normal cycles again became established.

Though moral evaluation of "rhythm" had by this time become fairly clear in the universal Church, medical and biochemical research still had some important questions to answer on ovulation time and its determination.

Nevertheless, married couples in many instances found the Ogino-Knaus findings, and tables or calendar devices based upon them, quite helpful. Fewer conceptions occurred than would otherwise have been the case. Some achieved added assurance and success by remaining continent for several extra days on either side of the time calculated as fertile.

But intimate understanding of the cycle's phases required other avenues of approach than those already described. For some decades, doctors had observed the condition of the ovary during surgery. However, knowledge of this kind accumulates slowly, and needs to be supplemented by methodical research. Systematic study of hormonal action, as well as of observable changes at or around ovulation, was highly desirable.

From ancient times men knew that blood is a carrier which influences mental and physiological behavior. Greek physicians spoke of "humors," but knew nothing of ductless or endocrine glands, as understood today. In 1849 the German physiologist Berthold experimented with cock characteristics, and found these returned when he implanted testes into castrated roosters. From this he inferred, without proving conclusively, a relationship between the testes and secondary sex traits, and that the blood is a carrier. But progress was slow in augmenting knowledge of internal secretions. Only in 1904 was the name hormones given to internal secretions

by Starling and Bayliss. They based the new terminology on a Greek verb meaning "arouse to action." It wasn't until 1927 that L. C. McGee applied more rigorous methods to the Berthold hypotheses and demonstrated that restoration of male characteristics was definitely related to an injection of testicular secretion.

What takes place in preparation of, and consequent to, conception needs brief description at this point. The pituitary gland, specifically the anterior lobe of the hypophysis located below the brain, is often called the "master gland" of the endocrine system. Among other functions, it sends forth gonadotropins which stimulate the gonads, or sex glands, to action. These latter, in turn, send into the blood stream hormones of their own (androgens and estrogen), which among other functions have a balancing action on the gonadotropin production. The end result is a more or less continuous production of sperm in the male and, in the female, the characteristic menstrual cycle. It is on the latter that our attention centers.

In the female a follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) goes out from the pituitary, and starts the process of follicular growth in the ovary. As the follicle matures, it secretes estrogenic hormones which in turn, through the pituitary, also effect changes in the endometrium or uterine lining. In the normal course of events, ovulation occurs as a developed egg bursts out of the follicular sac and begins its course down the tube. There, if it meets a sperm,

it can be fertilized. Meanwhile, the empty follicle is stimulated by the luteinizing hormone (LH) from the pituitary, and becomes a yellow mass called a corpus luteum. This latter, functioning as a temporary endocrine gland, secretes progesterone, which actively prepares the uterine lining for implantation of the embryo should fertilization occur.

In the event of pregnancy, progesterone continues to be required and is supplied by hormonal output from the corpus luteum and placenta. In pregnancy, progesterone through the pituitary blocks further follicular development and ovulation. Should there be no pregnancy, the corpus luteum ceases to be active, and the cycle is brought to a close. As a final step, the layers of tissue built up in the uterus in anticipation of possible pregnancy are sloughed off in menstruation.

## The Female Cycle

With this background, let us see what recent decades show us about how knowledge of the cycle and its functioning has been used in facilitating conception when desired, and

in avoiding pregnancy.

As early as 1904, the Dutch physician Van der Velde noted that temperature changes occur over the course of the cycle. But years elapsed before the relationship between ovulatory phase and temperature shift became clear. In the 1940's progress was made on this procedure. By the war's end it was evident a new and usable test for fertile days was under development.

As an aid to this procedure, a special thermometer of high sensitivity, and with a detailed gradient scale, was designed. Released in 1948 by Linacre Laboratories (New York City), it is distributed under the trade name Ovulindex, together with instructions on its use and with an explanation of the female cycle and its functioning. This system of testing relies on the fact that a distinct shift upwards of basal body temperature occurs at or near ovulation, so that a carefully kept record supplements calendar procedures by showing when ovulation is delayed and indicating when it has passed. Properly read, the temperature record also points to cycles which are anovulatory, that is, without release of an egg.

Writing in 1946, Dr. M. E. Davis of Chicago Lying-In Hospital told the medical profession that a "carefully prepared graph will provide much additional information for the physician such as the length of cycle" and the like. Later, Dr. Davis outlined the method in a popular book called Natural Child Spacing (Hanover House, 1953). Some subsequent findings on methods of determining ovulation time are to be incorporated into a new edition of

that book.

The chief advantage of the basal body temperature (BBT) test is the added assurance it gives couples using it correctly. Disadvantages concern problems of irregular hours, temperature rises from other causes, and the need for thermometer readings before arising each morning.

Since 1940 especially, attention was given increasingly to characteristics of the cervical mucus. Flow of mucus from the cervix of the uterus varies notably in volume, in cloudiness, in viscosity or stickiness, and in glucose concentration as the cycle passes from one phase to another. These variations, related as they are to hormonal shifts, can provide additional clues to ovulation time. The scientific problem involved is demonstrating that a particular test indicates ovulation.

It is less helpful merely to record chemical or physical changes which normally relate to ovulatory phase but are not necessarily *synchronous* with ovulation.

One group of researchers has focused on glucose in the mucus as an indicator, another group on hormonal content in the urine. The practical applications they envisage are sometimes referred to as "litmuspaper" tests, since these rely on color changes to indicate the time of the cycle. Thus, a "fertility-tester" was developed by Dr. Joseph B. Doyle of Boston and associates, and was announced in 1958. A prescription device, it records the glucose reactions to the mucus by means of a chemically treated paper brought into contact with the cervix. The procedure is related to earlier findings of Birnberg and others. Several reports on progress of clinical trials of this method have been published, and others are expected. Statistical validation of the method's effectiveness is still going on, and findings to date are encouraging. Thus far, the reports on urine tests do not evidence quite as much progress, but they are not without promise.

None of the tests mentioned interferes with body chemistry as such, or with physiological function. They rely simply on detecting changes occurring in the cycle, with a view to pinpointing ovulation time and thus rendering rhythm more effective. In this way they differ significantly from another approach, which actually applies knowledge of hormonal action and of the reproductive function to modify the body chemistry itself.

In the 1930's extracts from natural hormones already were being prepared for therapeutic use. By the middle of the decade, the chemical structure of progesterone had been identified. Later a compound was synthesized in German laboratories which produces in the body effects similar to those resulting from progesterone. In 1951, Dr. Carl Djerassi, of Syntex Laboratories in Mexico City, synthesized a progesteronelike compound which provided a basis for further developments. Out of his experiments grew Norlutin (norethindrone), a powerful progestational compound which can be administered orally.

Another compound in the same general category, though differing somewhat structurally, is *Enovid* (norethynodrel). It too can be taken in tablet form. Still another such drug is *Delalutin*, but this must be injected and hence has restricted possibilities for usage.

There are additional compounds,

progestational in nature, which either have been developed to the point of prescription use, or are under experiment. Some of these are very powerful, and require but small amounts to be effective. It is not unlikely, therefore, that production costs will decline sharply.

For the most part, progestational compounds originally were developed to protect pregnancy or to correct menstrual and reproductive disorders. Their use for genuinely therapeutic purposes is morally licit. Should they occasion infertility under such circumstances, this can be permitted on the principle of double effect. The purpose intended is restoration of health and correction of functional disorder.

#### The Moral Issue

But it has also been found that these compounds can be used to suppress ovulation, and hence create temporary sterility. Thus they become potential contraceptive agents, and for approximately four years have been experimented with as such. In Puerto Rico and elsewhere. it was found that women taking them from days 5 to 25 of the cycle (counting from the first day of menstruation), seemingly experience no ovulation. No pregnancy occurred, so long as regular use continued. When medication ceased. ability to conceive returned, as evidenced by subsequent pregnancy rates. Side effects, at least with purified drugs, appear to be negligible.

Now such use of drugs or serums raises grave moral questions, since it involves deliberate and direct suppression of normal reproductive function solely for contraceptive purposes. The intention no longer is to correct disorders—say by replacement therapy for hormone deficiency—but to remove the possibility of conception by preventing ovulation during the cycle or cycles in question. This is temporary stering used directly to suppress spermatogenesis in the male.

There are still other ways of achieving physiological control. It has been found, for example, that MER-25 (laboratory code name for a complicated formula of ethamoxy-triphetol) reduces litter size in rats. It does this, so far as can be deduced, by causing the product of conception to disintegrate in early stages of cell division, before descent into the uterus. At what precise point this occurs is not altogether clear, but it is known to be after conception.

From the moral viewpoint, this procedure involves attack not only upon reproductive function but also upon the human embryo. Any antifertility drug taken at, or within a few days after, coitus is presumably in this category. Experimentation with MER-25 has apparently been restricted thus far to laboratory animals, but its use with humans seems possible, since it acts specifically and without known side-effects.

Finally, there are drugs, such as certain antimetabolites, which can cause abortion after pregnancy has been established. Some of these reportedly have been tried with humans, in cases in which the termination of pregnancy was already decided upon. Moral comment on such procedures can be brief. It is just as wrong as abortion by surgical means.

Advances in our knowledge of the physiology of reproduction present various possibilities for medically effective regulation of fertility. Drugs in the abortifacient or feticidal categories are clearly ruled out on moral grounds. So too are those used simply to suppress ovulation and normal cycle function, with contraceptive intent. Some, however, can be used therapeutically to correct men-

strual disorders, including those which may stand in the way of effective use of periodic continence. How far this latter is feasible we do not yet know.

But most significant, from the moral viewpoint, is the fact that simple and morally acceptable tests for ovulation time are available or in process of development. These will be a real aid, and source of assurance, to couples with valid reasons for spacing children. And the same knowledge and tests, needless to say, can often assist the involuntarily childless in achieving the offspring they desire.

## The Ideal Communist

The ideal Communist is a combination of beaver and wolf. He unites machine-like industry with utter insensitiveness to deep human values whenever they come into conflict with political duty. He either knows at all times the course of history and "the one correct thing" to do at the moment, or, if he does not know it, he obeys someone else who claims to know it. In either case he "acts" with all the complacent self-assurance of a well-adjusted machine, and grinds to pieces anything that comes in his way, whether it be his own idea of truth, his most cherished hopes for this world or the next, or the person of a wife, friend or parent.—Thomas Merton in Thought, Winter 1959-60.

The fear that we as Catholics will use religious toleration here to gain the ascendancy in our country and then proceed to deprive our fellow citizens of freedom of conscience is utterly unwarranted by any doctrine of the Catholic Church.

# Nineteen Questions about a Catholic President\*

Most Rev. Karl J. Alter Archbishop of Cincinnati

Is there any conflict between the obligations made on an American Catholic by the U.S. Constitution and by the Catholic Church? Has there ever been any such conflict in the history of the United States?

There is no doctrine of the Catholic Church which is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and hence there can be no conflict between the obligations imposed by the Church and those imposed by the Constitution. The past history of our country reveals no in-

stance in which a Catholic citizen was faced with a problem of conscience arising from any provisions of the Constitution.

In an article in Look magazine for May 10, Presbyterian Dr. Eugene Carson Blake and Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam granted that no such conflict exists for Catholic American citizens, even when they become Mayors, Senators, or Governors of States. But they insist that such a conflict would arise were an American citizen to become Presi-

<sup>\*</sup>Reprinted with permission from the Sign, Monastery Place, Union City, N.J., July 1960.

dent of the United States. Is there any validity to their distinction?

The statement in Look magazine fails to make a necessary distinction between the duties of an executive officer and the duties of a legislator. The duties of a governor, by way of example, constitute an executive function; that of a senator is legislative. The making of laws is the responsibility of the legislative branch of government, not of the executive. Every legislator must follow his own conscience in voting on a proposed law, whether he be a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew. There is no evidence to justify the distinction therefore between the duties in conscience of a governor and the duties of the President of the United States. They differ only in magnitude and importance, not in their essential nature. The distinction attempted is, in respect to conscience, both fictitious and irrelevant.

In recent months, some Protestant leaders have raised specific issues. For example, they cite the insistence of the Church on providing parochial schools and then conclude that Catholics are opposed to the public school system of the nation. Do Catholics endorse the public school system?

The public schools were established in order to provide free and universal education. As Catholics, we approve this two-fold objective. If there were no public schools, we would have to create them. At the same time, we do not believe that

the state may in justice ignore the rights and duties of parents in choosing the kind of education they want for their children.

When the state sets up a monolithic and exclusive system of education by compulsory taxes and at the same time refuses to recognize the right of parents to a reasonable choice of their own, it denies freedom of education and violates distributive justice in principle.

In effect, it also violates the freedom of religion of a substantial group of citizens. There are, broadly speaking, two classes of citizens in the United States. Some hold that religion is an integral element in education, and they want it included in the curriculum. Others do not want religion taught in the schools. Under the present system, this latter group alone has all the benefits of the public taxes. Why should those who do not want religion discriminate against those who do? Those who want religion are not forcing it on others. They are not asking tax money for religion in the school, but only for the secular subjects in the curriculum. The present system offers a false neutrality.

Parochial schools exist to secure the rights of parents. These rights have been vindicated in a solemn decree of the U.S. Supreme Court. These schools moreover are no threat to the public tax-supported system of education; in fact, they are by their very nature an auxiliary public service and their mutual relations should be those of friendly cooperation, rather than conflict.

It has been frequently stated that Catholics insist they are entitled to public financial aid for their private schools whereas the Constitution's First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, forbids such aid. Could a Catholic President uphold the First Amendment as so interpreted by the high court?

Defenders and advocates of the rights of the parochial schools judge that parents have a legitimate grievance when denied any portion of public taxes in the education of their children. They know, however, that the present Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment makes it impossible to secure the kind of tax support granted in other countries-such as in England, Scotland, Holland, Belgium, Germany, and in others-but they entertain the hope that with patience and a sense of fair play the American people will in due time remedy the situation and redress their grievances.

The duties of the office of President of the United States have nothing to do with this question of parochial school support. It is exclusively a matter for the courts and the legislatures. The attitude of the President, whether favorable or unfavorable, could be expressed only if the Congress enacted legislation on the subject, and then only in accordance with the intent of Congress and the wording of the law.

Last year, many agencies, official and private, pressured the U.S. Government to provide birth control information to underdeveloped nations. Suppose Congress had voted such aid? The Catholic Church condemns, as immoral, artificial birth prevention methods. How could a Catholic be true to his Church and at the same time follow the legislative enactment of Congress?

As a matter of fact, Congress did not even consider the question, much less vote such birth control aid. Franklin Roosevelt, when President, generally refused to answer what he called "iffy" questions. The obvious reason is that a specific answer cannot be given unless there is a specific question based on a specific fact.

To avoid any semblance of dodging the issue, let it be clearly understood that neither the President nor any executive officer of government can be charged with responsibility for the morality of an act of Congress. That responsibility belongs to Congress alone. The action by which a federal law would be put into effect is never the free act of a single government official but of government as a composite entity. Hence, moral responsibility in the circumstances cannot be imputed to a particular individual. No President of the United States, whether he be a Catholic, Protestant, Jew, or infidel, can nullify an act of Congress. If as a Catholic he be convinced of the immorality of a specific law, he can take a passive attitude toward its enforcement. And thereby he violates neither his conscience nor his oath of office. A Catholic in office has no obligation in conscience to attempt to obstruct the fulfillment of any law by futile action.

There is a false inference in the question, namely, that a Catholic would be obliged to follow his conscientious convictions on birth control but that a Methodist would not need to do so, let us say, on legalized gambling, or a Quaker on the issue of war, or a Christian Scientist on a question of compulsory medical immunizations.

The Catholic Church places much emphasis on the censorship of books. She maintains an Index of prohibited writings, and, in America, she maintains such offices as the Legion of Decency and the National Organization for Decent Literature. The vast majority of Americans consider such prohibitions as restrictions on their liberty. How could a Catholic, in conscience, enforce the legal rights given American citizens by the First Amendment, regarding freedom of the press, freedom of speech?

It should be kept in mind, before taking up the details of the question, that the Catholic Church legislates in Canon Law for her own members and not for those outside her ranks. The Index of forbidden books imposes a restriction on Catholics only and has nothing therefore to do with civil government. Obviously, pornographic writings or such exhibitions are forbidden to everyone by the natural law and have their sanctions in the internal forum of conscience. The Supreme Court of the United States, moreover, has decreed that such professedly obscene writings do not enjoy the immunities provided by the First Amendment.

The larger question of so-called censorship, as exemplified in the purposes and action of the Legion of Decency and the National Organization for Decent Literature, must be answered with certain distinctions. To the extent that they evaluate the moral content of any picture, book, or drama, they do no more than any book review of a newspaper or magazine. Their recommendations on the basis of moral content have as much validity and legitimacy as do the popular reviews of the same material on the basis of their literary or artistic merits. Neither one nor the other invokes, per se, the sanctions of any civil law. The only debatable question is whether economic pressure or boycott should be used. The Church has no law on the subject and imposes no obligation. Any citizen can follow his own conscience in the matter within the context of the civil law. There is no more conflict of conscience, therefore, for a Catholic citizen or officer of government than for any other citizen or government official. As a matter of fact, the President of the United States has nothing to do with censorship, and the whole question is irrelevant in relation to his office.

Canon 1258 of the Church's Code of Canon Law forbids Catholics to participate actively in religious ceremonies of non-Catholics. Yet the President is often called upon to participate in such ceremonies, even in non-Catholic religious buildings. How could a Catholic President fulfill such obligations?

The Code of Canon Law (Can. 1258, par. 1) does indeed forbid active participation of Catholics in the worship of non-Catholics. Any other attitude would involve a contradiction between belief and practice and would constitute a sort of hypocrisy. The same Canon, however, in paragraph 2, specifically states that civil officials can be present passively, for good reasons, at public solemnities, funerals, weddings, and similar functions. There would be no problem in consequence for a Catholic President in following the usual protocol or accepted practice. Permission is given even to lav Catholics to attend passively in similar circumstances; and they frequently do so without scandal or comment.

Is there anything in the legislation of the Catholic Church which demands that the United States send a representative to the Vatican?

The flat and unqualified answer to the question is that there is no law of the Church and no Catholic doctrine which requires a representative at the Vatican from the United States or any other country. The maintenance of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and a particular civil government does not imply a recognition of the doctrinal claims of the Catholic Church. This is made evident by the fact that a country like England with an established national Church, namely, the Anglican, maintains diplomatic relations with the Vatican; so does Pakistan, which is Muslim; so also Japan, which has no official religion unless it be Shintoism; so also forty other separate governments with a variety of religious beliefs.

There has been no pressure put upon our government by the Catholics of this country to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican, in spite of the Protestant supposition to the contrary. The initiative came from our government for its own advantages. In fact, there is considerable reluctance among some Catholics to favor such diplomatic exchanges in view of the widespread unfavorable reaction which such a development would have on the public relations of the Church in this country.

Protestant opposition is due largely to a mistaken notion that diplomatic relations with the Vatican would create some kind of union of Church and State, or that it would imply some kind of religious favoritism, or perhaps an indirect approval of Church doctrine. No other government or people seems to entertain such unfounded fears. These governments continue to exchange representatives with the Vatican as a normal part of international relations. Such relations with the Holy See began as early as the eleventh century and have continued ever since. I recommend that anyone interested in this question would do well to read Vatican Diplomacy by Robert A. Graham, S.I.

Do you agree with Bishop Pike in his distinction when he states in his book "A Roman Catholic in the White House" (page 106), that "no American, no matter how anti-Roman Catholic he may be, could have any legitimate ground of objection to our sending some form of diplomatic representation to this tiny (Vatican) state," but not to the Holy See as an ecclesiastical entity?

Bishop Pike makes a valid distinction between the Vatican as an independent temporal sovereignty and the Vatican as the "Roman Catholic Curia," i.e., an international ecclesiastical headquarters. I agree that no American could have any legitimate ground of objection to our sending some form of diplomatic representation to the Vatican State; but one thing is certain, namely, neither our government nor the Vatican would find such representation acceptable. Moreover, it would have all the appearance of a subterfuge. It would be so interpreted by many people. The only justification for representation is that the Vatican exercises world influence as a spiritual force among hundreds of millions of people, and it is on this basis that it has accredited representatives from forty different governments today.

Can a candidate for public office or a government official "dissociate his religious convictions from his political decision-making"? (Book cited, page 70.)

No man, if he possesses integrity of character, may rightly dissociate his religious convictions from his decisions, whether they be political, social, economic, or otherwise. This is as true for a Protestant as for a Catholic. Before charging any man, however, with having violated his religious convictions, one had better, in the interests of truth and justice, be sure of the validity of his interpretation of another man's statements or actions.

Is there a distinct and consistent Protestant theory of Church-State relations versus a Catholic theory on the same subject?

The theory and practice of Church-State relations has varied from age to age, according to historical circumstances. In ancient times it was almost universally regarded as normal that the head of the government should be the head of religion. The Roman emperor was called "Pontifex Maximus," i.e., chief pontiff. Christianity drew a sharp distinction between the two on the basis of Christ's words: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Luke 20:25). Spiritual supremacy and temporal supremacy have been regarded as distinct ever since, by reason of a logical development of the principle enunciated.

The spiritual interests of man have been regarded by Christian men as of a higher order than his temporal interests, without, however, any inherent opposition between their just claims. Both Church and State are supreme in their respective functions, the one spiritual, the other temporal. The Church is an aggregate of souls for spiritual and eter-

nal interests; the State is an aggregate of citizens for material and temporal interests. They are coordinate powers, and neither is subordinate to the other in its respective field of jurisdiction. These principles have been commonly accepted, but history clearly reveals that the principles have been applied in different ways as circumstances varied from time to time and place to place. Any claim, therefore, of a distinctive and consistent Protestant theory of Church-State relations is not substantiated by the facts of history either in Europe or in America. The positions of Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, and other reformers were radically different from those common to Protestant Americans today.

But what about the Catholic position on Church-State relations? Does the Church advocate union of Church and State or separation of Church and State?

The terms used, namely union or separation, are subject to a variety of interpretations. They are popularly called "grab-bag" terms, because you can take out of them whatever you put into them. Without precise definition of their meaning, without an adequate understanding of the progressive development of Christianity in the social order, and without regard to the complexity of political situations, it is impossible to rescue the debate from confusion and futile argument. No one can possibly answer the question with a simple Yes or No.

If separation means a denial of the right of religion to influence public life, and if it means enmity and opposition on the part of the State, as was true in the days of Pius IX, then obviously the Church is opposed to that kind of relationship. If union means the domination of the Church by the State or vice versa, then again it is rejected by the Catholic Church as an infringement on the rights and liberties of either the Church or the State. We ought to cease using these ambiguous words of union and separation to describe a proper relationship between Church and State. At present they are little more than political shibboleths.

That is a good exposition from a negative viewpoint, but we still do not have a clear and positive statement of the Church's position. What are the minimum requirements of the Church?

To be specific, the Church must be free to define her own doctrine. to determine her own mode of worship, to establish a system of discipline within her own communion, and to fulfill her own function of teaching and sanctifying mankind according to the mind of Christ. In order to carry out these purposes, the Church must be independent of any other authority in the appointment of her officials, free from State interference in communicating with her members on all levels, free to own and use property sufficient to achieve her divine mission. The Church must enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. As a corollary of such freedom or autonomy, the Church must have the right to educate and the right to perform works of charity as being essential functions of religion. Since the Church claims a charter and constitution of divine origin, she needs no license or permission from the State to exist or to function autonomously.

Do you think that the Church is presently restricted by the United States Constitution and its amendments, or that its members are limited in their rights?

No! The Constitution declares all citizens equal before the law and specifies, moreover, that there shall be no religious test for public office. The First Amendment actually limits the jurisdiction of government by denying it any competence in the field of religion. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion nor prohibit the free exercise thereof."

Does this mean that the United States government is anti-religious or indifferent to religion, or refuses to recognize man's relationship and subordination to God as a social entity or collectivity?

No! The Constitution, at least indirectly, differentiates between the duties and function of the State and those of society. The State is only one agency of society, although a most important one. The United States Supreme Court has on two occasions solemnly declared that

"We are a religious people." Our government has built chapels for religious worship; it has provided chaplains for the armed forces; it opens the sessions of Congress with prayer; it inscribes on its coinage the motto "In God We Trust." No one can claim that our nation is indifferent to religion.

What about religious tolerance or freedom of conscience? Does the Catholic Church subscribe to these doctrines and public policies?

Yes, provided we have a clear idea of what we are talking about. There are two kinds of religious tolerance: the one civil, which means equality before the law; the other doctrinal, which means one religion is as good as another-even when they are contradictory. The Catholic Church subscribes wholeheartedly to civil tolerance, but rejects so-called doctrinal tolerance. This attitude rests not merely on expediency, namely, the avoidance of greater evils, but on a nobler principle of respect for truth and the way the mind arrives at it. As far as freedom of conscience is concerned, the Church not only accepts it, but in her Canon Law demands it as an essential condition of membership for all converts. Physical force, legal restraint, or any form of coercion are contrary and alien to the mind of the Church in considering the formation or determination of conscience.

There seems to be an inconsistency somewhere, in view of the public policy of Spain and certain LatinAmerican countries. How do you account for the difference in attitudes?

The differences are due not to different religious doctrine but to differences of national policy. Spain looks upon the disruption of religious unity through propaganda as a disruption of political unity. And she has had enough of it. The Church does not direct the national or public policy of any country. We must remember also that churchmen in Spain are also Spaniards with a long memory of the bitter persecution of their country by so-called Protestant countries. Why not speak of Ireland, where the percentage of practicing Catholics in the population is much higher, and in fact constitutes the overwhelming majority? There is no restraint there on freedom of speech or freedom of assembly for Protestants.

The fear that we as Catholics will use religious toleration here to gain the ascendancy in our country and then, having achieved political hegemony, proceed to deprive our fellow citizens of freedom of speech in religion, freedom of conscience, or impose our convictions upon them, willy-nilly, is utterly unwarranted by any doctrine of the Catholic Church, as well as by the consistent pronouncements of the American hierarchy. We seek no privileged status; we proclaim our full adherence to the provisions of the Constitution as of now as well as for the future.

What do some Catholic spokesmen of high rank mean when they say

that truth alone has rights-error has no rights? What practical conclusions follow?

As a first consideration, let us remember that these are abstract propositions, and as such presuppose a distinction between the objective and subjective order of truth. As Cardinal Lercaro states in his article which appeared in the January-February issue of the CATHOLIC MIND of this year: "When one affirms that truth is objective, by that very fact he admits of a distinction between truth itself and the act by which the individual yields to truth. Hence, in recognizing the objectivity of truth, the individual is, at the same time, establishing the right to personal freedom" (page 18).

"Truth alone has rights" must be understood in the sense that it alone -not error as such-can claim the allegiance of the human mind. Truth is imperious and exclusive, with an absolute and eternal value. From a practical viewpoint we must remember that rights and duties can be predicated only of human persons. We cannot attribute rights or duties to abstract nouns or soulless concepts. Hence, when it comes to a delineation of the rights and duties of an individual or a society, we must consider not only objective truth but the freedom and personality with which God has endowed the human mind and will. A truth imposed is not a truth accepted as such. Persuasion and conviction alone can generate truth in the human mind. Consequently, no ad-





verse conclusions can be drawn from the propositions quoted in the question against either tolerance or freedom of conscience.

Where can one find the most authoritative and clearest statement of Catholic principles in relation to the subjects we have discussed?

Not in the much quoted writings or encyclicals of Boniface VIII or in the Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX; not in the sense that their teaching is rescinded, but in the sense that they cannot be rightly understood outside their historical context. They are couched in a language of

polemics as well as of exposition.

The mind of the Church can be best understood in the writings of the modern popes, especially Leo XIII and Pius XII. Let me quote at the conclusion of this interview the words of Pius XII addressed to the Italian Catholic jurists, December 3, 1953: "The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot be an ultimate norm of action. It must be subordinate to higher and more general norms which in particular circumstances permit, and perhaps even seem to indicate as the better policy, toleration of error in order to promote a greater good."

## -A Candidate's Conscience

The difference between Catholic and Protestant morality lies not in the relative stress on obedience to conscience but on the different methods followed by Catholic and Protestant to discover God's moral law. The Protestant believes the Holy Spirit instructs him in the privacy of the soul by private inspiration. The Catholic believes the Holy Spirit instructs him through the Church, especially through the Pope and bishops. The Catholic may think the Protestant method is beset with grave dangers of hallucination while the Protestant may think the Catholic method is subject to undue human influence. But all this is beside the point in discussing the conscience of a candidate for public office. For the Constitution prescribes no particular method of educating conscience. It simply expects all public officials to obey conscience. It says very explicitly that no religious test shall ever be required for public office in the United States. Under our democratic system all religions are regarded as equals.-John B. SHEERIN, C.S.P., in the CATHOLIC WORLD, January, 1960.

The general proposition holds that a man, be he Catholic, Protestant or Jew, cannot separate his religious beliefs from his actions in political life. For the most part, however, religious belief shapes attitudes rather than specific policies.

# Religion and Public Office

REPRESENTATIVE PAUL SIMON Illinois State Legislature

IN A SENSE I am a layman speaking to laymen. I am a layman in the field of theology, speaking to theologians on a subject that covers both theology and politics. You are laymen in the field of politics.

Since the topic really enters two spheres, I think it is only fair that you know some of my theological prejudices before we get directly into the political. Not only is this fair to you to do this, but I frankly relish the opportunity. I have never been asked to speak on this subject before and I have made a few observations that disturb me. If you disagree with me—as I am sure many of you will—you can dismiss what I have to say as the foolish ranting of an ignorant layman. But I hope that at least a few of you will be disturbed, and perhaps one in your midst will be disturbed to the point of helping to provide leadership.

<sup>\*</sup>Reprinted with permission from the Cresset, Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Ind., April, 1960. The article was originally an address delivered to a group of ministers of the Wausau, Wisconsin area.

My prejudices include the belief that the usual division of what the world at large calls Christendom into Protestant and Roman Catholic (and perhaps Orthodox) is not a proper division. The real division is between those who believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God and those who do not, between those who believe that the resurrection is a reality and those who do not, between those who believe in the literal truth of the Biblical accounts of Christ's life and those who do not. In such a basic division, we find ourselves on the same side as our Roman Catholic brethren.

I am prejudiced in that I find a much greater sense of affinity with those who accept the Apostles Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed, than with those who reject all or parts of these creeds. Here again, I find myself aligned with my Roman Catholic friends, for these three creeds are accepted by both Lutherans and Roman Catholics.

I am prejudiced since I am a son of the Reformation and as such I recall that the Reformation involved the rejection of tradition when that tradition conflicted with the truth. It was not a rejection of tradition because it was tradition, but it was a re-examination in the light of revealed truth and a re-formation of beliefs on that basis. It is disturbingly clear that part of the tradition which much of modern Protestantism and much of modern Lutheranism has inherited is a tradition of militant, emotional anti-Catholicism. It

is overdue for the Church of the Reformation to take a fresh look at this tradition in the light of truth. In the political field, the Democratic party is frequently accused of "continuing to run against Hoover" instead of the Republican party of today. There is some justice to this charge. But in the religious field, there is also some justice to the charge that Lutherans of today are "running against" sixteenth century Catholicism, rather than the Roman Catholic Church of today.

I am prejudiced in knowing that, if I came to this meeting and delivered a bitter harangue against the Roman Catholic church, it probably would be received warmly. To give you the truth, as I see it, probably will mean leaving here today with fewer friends than when I came. Perhaps I understimate my audience. I hope so. But I recall vividly too many instances when I have heard speakers-probably in all cases sincere-distort the truth beyond recognition in an attack on the Roman Catholic Church and you could sense in the audience reaction that this had "caught fire." This was what they wanted to hear. What people want to hear seldom is what they should hear.

I am prejudiced by the fact that my work takes me into frequent contact with members of all denominations and many faiths. It has given me the opportunity to examine Protestant literature about Roman Catholicism and Roman Catholic literature about Protestant groups. In almost all cases on both sides the material is a collection of half-truths, falsehoods, and bitterness. The only Protestant publication I have seen in a long time which has the air of objectivity and is scholarly is the recent publication by one of our clergy, Dr. Jaroslav Pelikan's *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism*. If you have not read this, you should.

I am prejudiced by the fact that Luther and the Church which bears his name owe much to the voices of the early leaders of the Catholic Church. Augustine is the most obvious example. But there are many others. Recently the Roman Catholic church celebrated the festival of St. Ambrose, This is the Bishop of Milan who is quoted frequently and most favorably in the Augsburg Confession. Luther and his contemporaries found it spiritually profitable to listen to what Catholic leaders, living and dead, had said, and we should be following Luther's good example.

I am prejudiced by the fact that I believe the Bible to be the Word of God and, since this is part of my belief, I cannot reject Christ's message to me in John 17. The burden to be at one with my fellow Christians is not a burden I can cast from my shoulders. The young Indian student in the Calcutta airport was speaking to you as well as to me when he said recently in a casual conversation we had: "If for no other reason, I would not become a Christian because of the way you Christians talk about one aonther."

I am prejudiced by the fact that one of the names given to Satan in the Bible is "the accuser of our brethren." I cringe when I read it because I know that too often I have been guilty of being his tool. I would guess that this is a sin that you and I share. Too often pride has been our substitute for repentance. "Lord, we thank Thee that we are not as other men are" too frequently has been our individual and collective prayer, rather than "Lord, be merciful to me, a sinner."

I am prejudiced by the fact that only a few months ago I was going through the countries of Asia, through village after village and city after city in India without a single Christian church, Then I returned to my small town of Troy with 1,500 population where we have seven Christian churches. You cannot see this without being deeply disturbed by the sin of division within the Christian Church. In theory. the manpower we use in at least four of our Troy churches should be sent to those villages in India. I know this will not happen, but I must ask myself when I look at Troy, "What has happened that permits this terrible waste of Christian energy?" And when I ask the question the finger of guilt inevitably points to me. I share in the guilt and I must do something about it.

I am prejudiced by the fact that today in Germany the Lutheran Church and the Roman Catholic Church are cooperating as they never have since the days of the Reformation, the only period which compares at all being the dark days of the Nazis. This new cooperation between these Church bodies in Germanian control of the Church bodies in Germanian control of the Nazis.

many has been made possible because of the recognition of what they have in common: a common

faith and a common enemy.

I am prejudiced, finally, by the fact that I have been permitted to travel on five of the world's continents and I fear I have seen the face of tomorrow. If you have such a look, I don't think you can view your fellow Christians of other denominations as competitors. I do not mean that we should be disloyal to the truth as we see it, but part of lovalty to truth is a recognition of what we have in common as well as what separates us. Even more important is the significance of what we have in common. When the czars were at their worst in Russia, one of the debates which engaged the Church of that day was whether you should make the sign of the cross with two fingers or with three. Today that looks tragic. But will our heirs judge us any more kindly? If I were to hold a graph in front of you with one line representing the percentage of the world's population which is falling under Communist domination that line would be going steadily upward. The other line on the graph would be the percentage of the world's population which is at least nominally Christian. That line would be going steadily downward. What can change that ominous picture? It would take the entire afternoon to even partially answer that question, but I can tell you what will not change the picture: a loveless, fighting, bickering Christian Church which is more concerned

about knocking down her co-religionists than in bending every effort to bring the news of Christ to those

who hunger for it.

All of that may seem a long way from the topic of the possibility of having a Roman Catholic President in 1961. On reflection I am sure you will join in the belief that there is a direct relationship, whether you agree with what I have said or not.

The remainder of this paper is taken largely from material I wrote for a men's club discussion for the United Lutheran Church. A reference or two you will find more applicable to their group than to ours, but the basic applications are the

same.

Some Lutherans were shocked recently to see Dr. Franklin Clark Fry quoted in a national magazine as saying that he would vote for a Roman Catholic for the Presidency of the United States if he thought the Catholic candidate were a better man than his opponent.

Is this attitude right? What should the proper attitude be toward a Catholic running for that high office?

In discussing these questions with you, I'm going to be expressing my personal opinion on the basis of a limited experience in political life. To make this discussion meaningful, I will be getting into areas of disagreement and controversy. I trust that you will feel at liberty to disagree with me.

The basic question is: Generally speaking, does denomination form a legitimate basis for determining for

whom you will vote?

When I am campaigning for reelection, occasionally someone comes up to me and says, "Paul, you're a Lutheran and I'm Lutheran too. I'm

going to vote for you."

If I have the chance to explain, I try to point out that if my opponent is a Presbyterian or Methodist, but is a better man than I am, then my Lutheran friends ought to vote for my opponent. The fact that I am a Lutheran does not necessarily make me a better public servant.

I have known weak Lutherans who have sent out literature appealing for votes accompanied by a letter headed, "Dear Fellow Lutheran." This seems to me to be wrong.

Selecting a public official is like picking a man for a job. If you were to employ a mechanic in a garage, the big question would not be whether he is a Lutheran or a Catholic or a Jew, but whether he knows how to fix cars. And when you vote for public office, essentially you are employing someone to do a job, and the big question should be whether by attitude and ability he is the right man for the position.

I believe all of this holds true

also for Roman Catholics.

Many of my fellow Protestants, I fear, think that Roman Catholics in government positions fall down like dominoes at the will of a bishop or Cardinal or high church official. Roman Catholics do have their representatives at our state capitol in Springfield, as do the Protestants and the Jews. But Roman Catholics will divide among themselves on almost all issues. There is no more a

Roman Catholic "party line" on things than there is a Lutheran "party line." My experience in three terms in the Illinois legislature is that the Roman Catholic Church does not dictate political decisions to her members.

But what about countries where there has been abuse by the Roman

Catholic Church?

Beyond any question there have been areas where there has been abuse by the Roman Catholic Church—just as there have been areas where there has been abuse

by the Lutheran Church.

Countries where the Roman Catholic Church has a fine record for tolerance are rarely mentioned. Seldom is it mentioned that Ireland, which is 99 per cent Catholic, has had a Protestant president and a Jewish mayor of Dublin. Seldom is it pointed out that probably a majority of Lutheran ministers in Germany supported Konrad Adenauer, a Roman Catholic German leader.

I know of no instance in a democratic country, where the head of that government was a Roman Catholic, where the Roman Catholic abused that position. I feel that in the United States we would have a

similar experience.

In this connection it should be added that for some Protestants being a Christian means being "anti-Catholic." I recall meeting a young man in Germany who was to assist me in some army duties. He mentioned that he had heard that I was a Lutheran. Yes, I told him. He

beamed with obvious pleasure and then assured me that he was also a Lutheran.

"Our family," he said, "hasn't had one of its members marry a Roman Catholic since 1852."

"Do you attend the large Lutheran church down the street?" I asked him.

He flushed slightly and said he didn't attend church regularly. Upon further questioning I discovered that he had not attended a church service since he was confirmed more than fifteen years earlier. He was very proud of being a Lutheranbut his Lutheranism was a negative, anti-Catholic affair. He had accepted the emotional traditions of his family in being anti-Catholic, but any positive beliefs were almost totally lacking.

I'm afraid that gentleman has some emotional cousins in the United States.

If you were selecting an eye specialist to perform a delicate operation on your child's eye, you would look for the man who could best perform the operation. You would not look for a Lutheran or Protestant, but for a good surgeon.

Government today is also a delicate operation. While it may appear simple and easy to the outside observer, it is highly complex—and we need the man who can best perform that operation regardless of his personal religious inclinations.

Is religious affiliation then never a consideration?

Generally it is not, but in some cases it can be.

A man cannot divorce himself from his personal background.

For example, my Lutheran background probably has helped to shape my attitude on the gambling question.

A Roman Catholic, because of his background, probably will have a different attitude toward birth control than many.

A member of the Jewish faith generally would have a sympathy toward Israel. Naming a member of the Jewish faith to be ambassador to Egypt probably would not be wise.

A Christian Scientist would not get my vote of approval to head the Department of Public Health.

In other words, a man's religious background will help to shape certain attitudes. However, this does not mean that the Pope or the chief rabbi or the president of the Lutheran World Federation would be dictating policy to some member of his faith who holds public office.

Recently a college president told me: "The bad thing about having a Catholic president is that he would be attending the Catholic services regularly if he were a good Catholic. Simply by his example, large numbers of people would be inclined toward joining that church. If he were a weak Catholic, I might vote for him, but not if he were a strong Catholic." Is he right?

I think it would have to be conceded that having a Roman Catholic President would be good public relations for that church body.

But how many people have joined the Presbyterian Church because President Eisenhower attends Presbyterian services? I doubt if there are many. The fact that a President attends church services may create a bit of tendency toward thinking that attending church services is a good thing, but it probably does not get much more specific than that.

The second point mentioned by the college president is that if the candidate were a weak Roman Catholic he might vote for him, but not if he were a strong Roman Catholic.

All things being equal between the candidates (which is not likely), one of whom is a weak Roman Catholic and one a strong Roman Catholic, my own preference would be for the strong Roman Catholic. The man who has strong convictions about moral principles is a man I would much prefer to have guide my country, rather than one who lacks moral backbone.

Aren't there Roman Catholic statements which indicate that the public office holder must listen to the Pope for political advice and be subservient to him?

There are statements which state just that. There are also statements which deny this. There is difference of opinion on many things within the Roman Catholic Church just as there is within other church bodies.

The official Roman Catholic doctrine is that the Pope is infallible only when he speaks ex cathedra on matters of faith and morals, and this is rare. A Roman Catholic has as much right to decline the advice of the Pope on a political matter as you or I do. In all probability, any President, whatever his religious persuasion, would listen carefully to the opinions which the Pope or any other leading religious figure might express. But any President would be free to accept or reject such advice.

Don't Roman Catholics vote pretty much as a bloc?

To some extent it is true that Roman Catholics tend to vote for Roman Catholics just as Lutherans tend to vote for Lutherans. Ethnic and cultural groups have a tendency to vote for someone within their own group, Germans vote for Germans. Scandinavians for Scandinavians, Methodists for Methodists, etc.

As a group becomes thoroughly accepted into the American community, this tendency declines. For example, Polish people will tend to vote for someone with Polish background much more than Germans will vote for a German. The Irish today are not the solid bloc they once were. Negroes have a strong tendency to favor Negro candidates and Jews heavily favor Jewish candidates; both of these groups feel a lack of total acceptance into the American community. Methodists and Baptists and Presbyterians have only a slight tendency to vote as a bloc because they feel very comfortably a part of the American community: the defense mechanism of voting "for one of their own" is not present to any marked degree.

Roman Catholics today do not vote as a bloc to the degree they did twenty or forty years ago. If either party puts a Roman Catholic on the national ticket (as this is being written both parties are considering it) and there are strong attacks made on a Roman Catholic being a candidate, there will be an increasing tendency for Roman Catholics to support a Roman Catholic.

However, many Roman Catholic officials have warned against this. The late Cardinal Stritch not too many months before his death issued a strong statement which stated that his position was to vote for the man more qualified to do a job, regardless of his affiliation. He said that if a Protestant could perform a job more ably than a Roman Catholic candidate, he would be consciencebound to vote for the Protestant.

Does that mean that a man's personal religious life can be separated from his functioning as a public

official?

Generally the answer to that question is that you cannot separate faith from life; to separate it is a dangerous thing. My religious beliefs should permeate everything I do, whether in the sphere of politics or teaching or barbering or whatever it might be. I don't think a man can attend church on Sunday and then on Monday find no relationship between his religion and issues like foreign aid and racial discrimination.

At the same time there are two things we should keep in mind here:

1. While my religious life will help mold my opinion, I think I should be slow to state that on a specific issue a certain position is the Christian or moral position. I think there are issues where that can become clear (such as racial discrimination), but I think Christians in government should be cautious about equating their own position

with God's position.

While faith does affect political actions, there is a valid dual role between an official's public life and personal life. Moses recognized this on the issue of divorce where in his personal life he believed one thing, but as a public servant he faced a realistic situation and had to take a very different position. A city clerk in my home town was a devout Baptist who believed all drinking of a strong liquor to be a sin. Since he had to sign the liquor licenses, he resigned. I think he did the wrong thing; he failed to make the proper distinction which Moses made. A Roman Catholic judge believes that all divorce is wrong and he follows this in his personal life. But as a judge he must grant divorce according to the law and not according to his personal tenets. In a sense he plays a dual role.

The general proposition nevertheless holds that a man cannot separate his personal religious beliefs from his actions in political life. For the most part it shapes attitudes rather than specific policies. Two men of Christian persuasion, who believe they should love their neighbor as themselves, may disagree with each other on the specific program of carrying out that principle: but neither can disregard the basic precept without violating the religious

belief he claims.

The devotional recommendations of Fatima are not substitutes for asceticism or the obligations arising from the essential elements of Catholic belief—the Creed, the commandments and the sacraments.

#### Fatima-Facts and Questions\*

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THIS threatens to become an article which is all introduction because the question of Fatima and its message calls for so many preliminary distinctions and qualifications.

The disagreement among learned authors, the printed statements and interviews, many of which have been published with ecclesiastical approval, and the wildly exaggerated claims have all served to cloud issues and raise tempers.

Since full-sized books have been produced on this subject of analyzing the Fatima question, it is certainly idle to suppose that a single article can do more than summarize what seem to be the most solid conclusions. That is precisely the goal I have set for myself: not independent research or independent conclusions, but rather the function of a clearing-house that brings together in brief compass some of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>e</sup>Reprinted with permission from the Marianist, University of Dayton, Dayton 9, Ohio, May, 1960.

results of the research already completed.

The first truth that must be held with no hesitation or compromise is the fact that every claim made about our Lady's appearances at Fatima in 1917 concerns a private revelation at best. Therefore, nothing stemming solely from this source may ever be construed as binding on Catholics as obligatory doctrine.

The reason is that public revelation closed with the death of the last apostle. Everything needed for salvation has already been given to the Church. No private revelation can on its own responsibility make explicit what is implicit in the official deposit of faith, nor add to the perfection of what God has entrusted to His Church. To hold any other doctrine than this is tantamount to a denial of the institution of the Catholic Church as the official teaching body placed in the world by Jesus Christ.

Furthermore, Catholic theological teaching is unanimous in saying that the approval of the Church concerning private revelation is at best permissive, not obligatory. This means that the fact which is supposedly supernatural contains nothing contrary to the faith or morals of the Church, and that it seems to present signs by which the revelation or apparition can be admitted with merely human faith as having occurred.

Even more, ecclesiastical approval does not mean that the Church forbids further investigation, which might uncover facts against the apparition or revelation.

#### How the Church Approves

Father C. M. Staehlin, S.J., says in this connection that the Church gives all its approbations with the implicit condition, "as long as arguments to the contrary do not appear." He adds that in certain instances the Church has made obligatory certain forms of devotion which were inspired by private apparitions and revelations, but the fact that a devotion is obligatory does not mean that the apparition was necessarily genuine nor that the revelation must be believed.

Devotions approved by the Church are approved because of their intrinsic theological orthodoxy and their prudence. They must agree with or grow out of the official public revelation, even though private revelation may have been the occasion for their appearance.

A previous article of mine on claims attributed to Sister Lucy (America, July 4, 1959) brought a flood of favorable letters, but it also brought a vociferous and sometimes insulting minority dissent. One correspondent quoted an article from a Catholic mission magazine to this effect: Private revelations do not have to be believed under pain of heresy, but if they are rejected, this is "under pain of irrationality."

The article further claimed that disbelief in a private revelation was an "insult to Christ and to His Blessed Mother."

One can only regret the appearance of material like this in print, because it confuses devout though

ignorant readers, and gives them a caricature of true Catholic doctrine. Logically, this author implicitly called Catholic doctrine "irrational" and "insulting to Christ and to Mary," because it teaches that no private revelation can add to the public deposit of faith, and none has to be accepted.

None the less, this same doctrine certainly applies to Fatima. Any cult or devotion out of Fatima is based theologically on official Catholic belief, not on Fatima as such. The Church has certainly approved Fatima, but—and this is critically important to note—the Church has never said precisely what is ap-

proved.

Father William G. Topmoeller, S.J., summarizing the results of the controversy over Fatima, lists these points:

 All Catholic authors admit genuine supernatural apparitions of our Lady to the three children at Fatima;
 that Mary committed a message

to the children;

 and that the "prodigy of the sun" was a true miracle.

The dispute centers about 2 points:

- Precisely what are the authentic parts of the message of our Lady of Fatima?
- Precisely what was the nature of the "miracle of the sun"?

#### Lucy's Message

Let me make it clear at once that, in the discussion about the various versions of Lucy's message from our Lady, there is no implication that Lucy has deliberately changed its contents.

There is, however, an explicit fear that in good will she has enlarged upon them. There is, also, the even more explicit and more likely possibility that the nature of an intellectual supernatural experience could not be expressed in words. Hence, it had to be clothed in symbolic or figurative expressions. Therefore, these are not to be taken literally; such expressions in part lead to the confusion.

Father Edward Dhanis, S.J., distinguishes between what we describe here as "old history" and "new history." The "old history" consists of the official interrogation made by Canon Formigao in 1917, the parish priests' deposition, the contemporary newspaper accounts, and the 1919 diocesan canonical inquiry. The "new history" represents statements made by Sister Lucy in 1925-27, 1937-38, and 1941-42.

Father Dhanis (and the conservative writers with him) does not automatically discard all the new elements introduced by Sister Lucy in the "new history." However, he says, each one of these additions must be examined according to its individual merits. In this policy he seems most prudent and justified.

"If we were to summarize the message of Fatima from what we learned in 1919," Father Topmoeller writes, "we would have something like this:

"I am the Lady of the Rosary. I have come here six times to urge

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you to say the rosary each day. People must ask pardon for their sins and must amend their lives. I have told you a secret. I have worked the prodigy of the sun to prove who I am."

For me, this is essentially the message of Fatima. We should ask pardon for our sins, we should amend our lives, and we should perform the duties of our state of life in a spirit of penitential generosity as a means of making reparation for the sins of the world.

Every item mentioned here has already been contained in the official preaching and teaching authority of the Church. Therefore, Fatima in this would be doing what genuine private revelations are expected to do: it would be an occasion to remind people of a truth already contained in the official deposit of the faith left by our divine Saviour.

The additions made by Lucy in later depositions cause misgivings. Again I emphasize that they are not automatically to be discarded. For example, following Father Dhanis, it would seem that our best course would be to suspend judgment on the supposed "vision of the angel" to the three children in 1916. Lucy first told her mother she saw a white sheeted form. In the 1917 deposition she said it was "nothing," and "she thought she ran away." But in 1942, this was described as "a sort of cloud whiter than snow, transparent, in human form; a radiant youth."

The angel, with a notable lack of theological accuracy, taught the children a prayer offering the divinity of Jesus to the Blessed Trinity.

For the first apparition of our Lady on May 13, 1917, the early reports show that "the lady" added, "and I will come back here a seventh time." In October Lucy said that our Lady never said anything about coming back after the six times. Father Martindale says that the word "here" was a mistake on Lucy's part, and he identifies the seventh vision with an apparition Lucy had in the convent in 1925.

At this point, too, there seems to be need for even more conservatism, namely, in the question of Sister Lucy's later visions and new revelations. The Church's approval of Fatima (still permissive at best, like that for any other private revelation that is approved) should basically be linked with the 1917 events at Fatima.

To continue linking Lucy's further revelations with the earlier ones does not appear to my mind to be justified, because anything later is certainly not included in the earlier revelations approved by the Church. In my America article I stated:

In the case of Sister Lucy, are we to consider her as some sort of infallible pipe-line to the Blessed Virgin and to the eternally inscrutable counsels of God? What happens to belief in the infallible teaching authority of the Catholic Church if claims of an individual, even of a woman as sincere and as holy as Sister Lucy, are treated as the word of God?

To put the idea even more explicitly, those theologians whose research has served as source material for this article are agreed on this fundamental point: the approval of the Church regarding the content of the revelations as expressed in 1919 is by no means automatically extended to the subsequent additions made by Sister Lucy.

#### Number of the Damned

An allied difficulty, to my mind, concerns some of the statements little Jacinta attributed to our Lady, before the girl died on February 20, 1920. For example, there is the oft-quoted, "The sins that cause most people to go to hell are those of the flesh."

Now, one of the principles of Catholic theologians concerning private revelations is that no private revelation can solve a mystery which has been left unanswered in the public deposit of the faith.

The reason is evident; for otherwise official Catholic belief would undergo a substantial addition. If there is any truth of eternity about which we are ignorant, it is certainly the mystery of eternal salvation—the number of the saved.

Closely allied to that would seem to be the question of the particular cause of salvation or damnation. To ascribe damnation largely to sins of the flesh has always been popular, despite the warnings of approved theologians that graver sins exist.

In fact, modern Catholics have been criticized for being hypersensitive on the subject of chastity, but callous to their own sins of interracial injustice. Hence, I find it difficult to believe that God (through our Lady) would now reveal a partial answer to an otherwise inscrutable mystery.

Father Martindale points out that Jacinta did not perhaps understand what she said. At Aljustrel, Jacinta told her mother, "You must never eat meat on Fridays nor give it to me, because our Lady said that sins of the flesh bring many to hell." Carne is the word she used.

Or again, "Fashions will offend our Lord very much. People who serve God should not follow the fashions. The Church has no fashions. Our Lord does not change." The fact is that reputable moral theologians in the Church teach that fashions do change, that we become accustomed to what is usual, and that modest dress should be considered that which is the custom of local, contemporary good people, provided extremes are avoided. It is simply the fact of history that while chastity never changes, the applications of modesty change according to time and place.

But to return to the first question, namely, Lucy's more detailed explanations in later years of material supposedly contained in the first revelation. The third apparition of July 13, 1917, was first reported with the recommendation from our Lady to recite the rosary daily for peace and for the end of (World) War (1), and the promise of a great miracle in October. But in a document published in 1942, Lucy said many other points were also parts of the third apparition.

First came the vision of hell. Even Fonseca joins Fathers Martindale and Dhanis in saying that it is not necessary for us to accept all the literal details of Lucy's description of hell. God seems to have illumined the children's minds as to the terrible effects of grave, unrepented sin. Lucy transmitted this illumination in the imagery to which she was accustomed.

In the third apparition Mary is quoted by Lucy as having promised a night illumined by a great light as the sign that the punishment of the world was at hand. On the night of January 25, 1938, Portugal experienced a remarkable display of the aurora borealis. Lucy wrote to the bishop that although men of science tried to regard it as a mere natural phenomenon, she was sure it was of more than natural origin, as the promised light announcing God's chastisement. Father Martindale notes on this that Lucy seems to have reversed herself, then finally did decide that this was the omen.

Even more confusion surrounds whether our Lady asked for the consecration of Russia or the consecration of the entire world to her Immaculate Heart.

In 1940 Lucy wrote to Pius XII that because this consecration had not been done, we were experiencing World War II; Russia otherwise would have been converted. Actually, such a claim that would make life on this earth a veritable peaceful paradise at the stroke of a papal pronouncement smacks almost of magic, as one author commented.

If the death of Jesus Christ on the cross twenty centuries ago did not take suffering and war from the world, one wonders how and why we in our 20th century would be spared the troubles of living in a world of suffering and sin, provided such an easy means was used. In this connection Father Martindale acutely asks about Hitler, because Hitler started World War II, not Russia.

But to summarize all the discussion on the point of the correct wording, evidently "Russia" is to be preferred to "the world." On July 7, 1952, Pius XII consecrated Russia to the Immaculate Heart of Mary, just as he had already consecrated Russia as part of the world consecration on October 31, 1942.

I completely disagree with a writer on Fatima who criticized the Holy Father for not acceding earlier to Lucy's wishes. God does not govern the Church by means of private revelations, but by means of the ordinary laws by which He leads men to make their decisions.

In fact, I think protest should be made against the popular preaching of the penance message of Fatima in some quarters as a "terror technique" that seems to deny the constant loving and merciful providence of Almighty God, and that seems to promise that prayer in the Fatima pattern will infallibly bring about the terrestrial paradise of peace among nations. One must bluntly say that the consecration of Russia has been accomplished, and that for its religious, not its temporal,

values. Has the world situation been ameliorated as far as the prospects of a war of annihilation are con-

The practice of the devotion of the Five First Saturdays was revealed to Lucy in a vision in her convent on December 10, 1925. Theologians, of course, have wondered about the possibility of autosuggestion, because the whole vision is closely modeled on the revelations of St. Margaret Mary Alacoque and the Nine First Fridays. Although Father Dhanis does not accept the possibility, he simply says that we do not have sufficient evidence to pass judgment.

At any rate, the practice of honoring the Immaculate Heart of Mary has long been approved by the Church. St. John Eudes had already recommended it three centuries ago.

#### Fatima No Substitute

The devotional recommendations from Fatima should not be taken as substitutes for the hard steps of asceticism or (we add) substitutes for the obligatory elements of Catholic belief: the Creed, the commandments, and the sacraments. These are the essentials, given us officially by God. We have no right to be remiss in our duty toward the obligatory duties of our faith.

It must be on this basis that all discussions of Fatima are carried on. We must still remember the universal law of love of God and of neighbor, taught by the Church of Jesus Christ and binding on us all. Here, too, are the essentials of belief in God's loving providence and mercy. These always remain the essentials.

We will not please our Lady (because we will not be pleasing her Son) if we run after devotional will o' the wisps, forgetting the essentials.

I have in no way called Fatima a will o' the wisp; but Fatima and its message must be looked at and preached about and lived out in the whole context of the duties of one's state of life and the finding of God's will in obscure humble faith in His official word and in His Church.

#### DOCUMENTATION

The North American College\*
JOHN XXIII

THIS feast day of Our Blessed Lady's motherhood has been for Us a rich and gratifying source of holy joy. Early this morning, amid the solemn splendor of St. Peter's basilica, We offered the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass in the presence of a group of departing missionaries, before giving each of them his crucifix. And now, Venerable Brothers and Dear Children, We come to visit and speak with you at this Pontifical College of the United States of North America.

You are celebrating today the centenary of the happy founding of this seminary. To mark the occasion you have journeyed in large numbers from your homes afar, to join the faculty and students of the college in rendering due thanks to God, and to give expression to the love and loyalty that is warm in your hearts. United with you, too, in the joyful chorus, are, We are sure, all of your noble country's bishops, priests and faithful. In spite of the great distance that separates them, the

warmth of their affection brings them close.

Eager to share in your jubilation, We have hastened most readily to pay you this visit, to give you this outward sign of Our congratulations, enfolding you, as it were, in Our fatherly embrace. May it serve to show you and yours the immense affection which the Apostolic See entertains for your nation, and in particular for its bishops and Catholic people.

people.

That is the foremost reason why We have entered these spacious and graceful buildings, built on their solid foundations on the Janiculum Hill, in full view of the Vatican and its cupola. It is heartening here to recall that blessed day, all of six years ago, when Our predecessor of revered memory, Pius XII, solemnly dedicated this edifice and hallowed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>o</sup>An address to the students of the North American College, Rome, on the centenary of the founding of the seminary, October 11, 1959.

its chapel after delivering an address unusually rich in wisdom and pastoral zeal. From Our patriarchate in Venice We followed, for Our part, the news reports of those magnificent festivities. Now, by the ever-gracious disposition of God, it falls to Our happy lot to celebrate with you, in the early months of Our pontificate, the close of the first 100 years since your seminary was established.

#### Tributes of the Roman Pontiffs

But many and notable already have been the tributes of fondness and esteem lavished by the Roman pontiffs on this college during those 100 years. And surely We may see a providential design in the fact that its path has been lighted, and its history bound up with the progressive glorification of the Blessed Virgin, Mary Immaculate. The benign image of the Mother of God, smiling down upon her students in the chapel apse, remains a perpetual reminder that Pope Pius IX of imperishable memory made public his decision to found the college only a few days after he defined the dogma of Our Lady's Immaculate Conception.

It was Pius IX, likewise, who saw to the purchase and furnishing of a suitable home for you here in Rome, and who found time, hardly a month later, to pay you a paternal visit and to celebrate Mass within the seminary walls. As the Apostolic Letter *Ubi Primum* plainly attests, your college was also the object of constant concern and special benevolence on the part of Pope Leo XIII, who bestowed upon it, among other blessings, the title "pontifical." Its very name would make it clear that the Roman pontiffs hold it in tender regard, as something of their very own.

No less keen was the interest of Our predecessor, Pius XI, who entrusted the administrative control of the college to a committee of bishops under the authority of the American Hierarchy. Our time would soon be up, were We to make mention of all the other proofs of this abiding commitment, from the tranquil beginnings of the college down to its recent transfer to these new quarters, with the felicitous provision that its original home would henceforth be reserved to newly-ordaind and other priests desirous of pursuing higher studies in the sacred sciences.

Venerable Brothers and Beloved Sons! Gathering these memories with joy in Our heart, We join with you in rendering sincerest thanks to God for the divine grace He has bestowed upon your human undertakings through the intercession of Mary, Virgin most pure. Prodigious indeed was the power from above which enabled you to expand your newly founded college in all directions! See how that tiny pioneer group of seminarians—there were only 13 of them at the time—has grown to be legion, has become rather a whole army of distinguished priests, marching proudly on to victory, under the banners of Holy Church, the peacemaker, in your glorious native land!

Many of these graduates have worn the Roman purple as Cardinals. Many more have been raised to the episcopate. All of them are doing

important and meritorious work, each in his appointed place.

#### Progress of the Church in America

The development of the college also presents an extraordinarily close parallel to the growth of Catholicism among your people at home. A century ago the situation and status of the Church in the United States of America was still that of a mission territory, and the time had not yet come when every diocese could afford to establish and maintain a seminary of its own. Succeeding decades have witnessed a gradual and steady increase in the number and influence of American Catholics, calling to mind the parable of the mustard seed, which "becomes a tree, so that the birds of the air come and dwell in its branches" (Matt. 13:32).

For every feature of your diocesan life reaped its share of profit from the cultivation and flowering of this hardy plant: catechetical instruction for the faithful, Catholic schools and universities, charitable organizations of all types, and social action groups—to mention only the most conspicuous among your many institutions. We would not, however, pass over in silence that remarkable blossoming of the life of prayer within your American flock, thanks in great measure to the leadership of the monasteries dotting the length and breadth of the land. All of this goes to show that large numbers of American Catholics are endowed with mature judgment and imbued with a consuming love of God, giving Us the best of grounds for comfort and high hopes.

But your charity does not stop at your country's frontiers. In the guise of "cheerful givers" you have organized an endless chain of agencies for the generous relief of the needy in almost every corner of the world. That cannot but mean that "God is able to make all grace abound in you, so that always having ample means, you may abound in every

good work" (II Cor. 9:8).

Priority among so many merits must be accorded, just the same, to the solicitude with which you have made provision for the education of students for the priesthood, of which the brilliant results are here in your two buildings at Rome.

In erecting this new college, equipped with every artistic and technical convenience and in assigning its former site to the use of priests, you have made impressively clear your desire to devote the best of your effort and energy to the proper formation of God's ministers. That is exactly as it should be; for in the whole splendid program of work and planning for the establishment and spread of the Kingdom of God, surely this is the labor of labors, this is the plan of plans.

How exalted, in very truth, is the dignity of the priesthood! What virtue, what power it implies! To cite the words of Our recent encyclical letter Sacerdotii Nostri primordia: "The figure of the priest is always present before our eyes. What would we do without him? If his daily work were to fail us, of what avail would be all our apostolic projects, including those which best meet the needs of our times?" (Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. 51, 1959, pp. 575-6). So much, then, is required of priests in the Church today that absolutely nothing must be left undone to forward and perfect their education.

But you obviously had a further end in view when you built and blessed this seminary. You wished to impart to your students a Roman education. You wanted to form priests, that is to say, who had lived in this beloved capital city of Christendom and drawn deeply from its

unquenchable stream of virtue and courage.

For this is the city, as Our predecessor, St. Leo the Great, observed, in which God has prepared that empire "whose conquests are to extend to the point where all nations everywhere become friends and neighbors" (Ser. 82; ML 54, 423). It still enshrines the law, the institutions. and the magnificent remains of the Romans. Here, above all, the faith of Peter still binds the Church together. Here gleam the tombs of the martyrs who "gloriously shed their blood for the Lord."

Beyond all doubt, therefore, the minds and hearts of seminarians living at Rome-and what is more, at an age when the seeds of virtue to come are being sown with bounteous hand-cannot fail to be enriched, not merely by the humanistic tradition for which the city is renowned, but more importantly than all by its spirit of utter loyalty to the Church, whence the life of every worthy priest is nourished and sustained.

These first 100 years have offered outstanding proof of your fidelity to this ideal, of your ardent yearning to see it realized. And this college, built with much labor and sweat, this spendid fruit of your prudence and foresight, will stand as an abiding public testimonial to the munificence of your zeal. When these young men, on the other hand, return to their native shores as ministers of God, they will carry along with them the happy ferment which leavens the whole mass. They will bend to their appointed tasks generously and without stint. They will bring to birth and rear a new generation to follow in their footsteps.

For you students, finally, We would add a word of fatherly exhortation. Let your response to the high expectations placed in you be in the fullest measure diligent and faithful. To that end you will be called upon to cherish, day in and day out, "a fervent desire to advance in virtue, a love of discipline, the spirit of penance and prompt obedience" (Imitation of Christ, Book I, c. 23). You must apply yourselves strenuously to the preparation of those future assignments which cannot be carried out successfully without the grace of God. Virtue of a high order and degree must enlighten your minds and set your hearts aflame. Since you are being trained in this majestic City of Rome, close to the Chair of the Prince of the Apostles, your entire lives, in a word, must reflect holiness and serious purpose.

We earnestly beg of Almighty God that He may deign to support, protect and prosper, through years to come, the college upon which He has bestowed such favor during the past century. And we fondly trust that this day, on which you have had the happiness to reach the goal of your longings and strivings of a hundred years, may bring new vigor to you all, enabling you to go forward, cheerful and undaunted, to even richer and more heartening accomplishment in the years that lie ahead.

In Our desire abundantly to confirm these paternal good wishes, and to show you once more how close are the bonds of affection which unite Our heart with yours, We gladly impart to you, Venerable Brothers and Beloved Sons, Our Apostolic Blessing.

May it be a gauge of never-failing aid from on high, for you whom We are so pleased to see before Us, for all who are charged with the direction of the College, and for its student body—those of the current year along with those already at work in the vineyard—and for your fellow-Americans, one and all, who are as dear to Us as they are to yourselves.

#### Artificial Insemination and the Law\*

### I THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S TEACHING

1. THE Catholic Church's teaching on artificial insemination is based on the principle, fundamental to Catholic moral science, that the objective order of means to ends, established by God in human nature and discernible by logical deduction from the observable facts. provides the key to morality in human conduct. Thus the manner in which human faculties work indicates the ends which they are meant to serve, and also the means by which these ends are to be attained. This indicated order of means to ends we call the natural moral law. because it is a morally binding ordinance written by God into the very nature of things and promulgated to mankind by the natural light of reason. It is derived not from what the happiness of individuals may seem to require, nor from statistics of what men tend to do, but from what, according to the integral design of the Creator, they ought to do. We readily admit the moral conclusions to be drawn from this design are not always immediately evident. In what may be called the by-ways of morality, we would often fail to read the signposts of nature correctly and confidently, were it not for the guidance of Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church. But the signposts are there to be read, and we are morally bound to interpret and respect them.

2. It follows that, in assessing the morality of the voluntary exercise of a human faculty, one must not consider in isolation either the end it is designed to serve, or the means provided by nature for that end. However good the desired end may be, it cannot confer moral lawfulness on an unlawful means; the end cannot justify the means.

3. The correct application of these principles to human artificial insemination requires therefore a correct evaluation of means to ends in the use of the generative faculty. It is important to note that the end served by this faculty is different in kind from that served by other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>e</sup>A statement "on behalf of the Catholic body of England and Wales" prepared at the behest of Cardinal William Godfrey, Archbishop of Westminister, by a group of theologians and members of the medical and legal professions and presented to the British Government's Departmental Committee on Artificial Insemination.

faculties, such as sight and hearing. These are clearly means to the individual good of their possessor, and since he has a personal right to the fully human life they are meant to serve, he may rightly supply artificially for accidental deficiencies in their working, for example, by the use of reading glasses or hearing aids. The human generative faculty, on the contrary, is not designed primarily and directly for the good of its individual possessor, though it should serve that end secondarily and indirectly. It is neither complete nor independent in either sex. The complementary nature of the generative organs, the mutual act in which they properly function, the procreative purpose they serve, indicate that they are designed to be used not in solitary acts, but with another person, and for the good of the human species.

4. The good of the human species further requires that the exercise of this faculty be limited to those who are united by the permanent bond of marriage, because only so can children normally be assured of that intimate and secure relationship which enables them to be reared

to a balanced and harmonious maturity.

5. Read as a whole, the design of the procreative function points to the moral obligation of achieving its purpose only by means of the conjugal act naturally performed. The parents of the human child are not mere agents in a biological process. They are persons, co-operating in the production of another person by a means which in nature's plan is hardly less important than the end itself. According to that plan, it is not enough that a child be the product of biological elements derived from its parents; it should be the fruit of an intimate physical act of personal union, prompted and inspired by mutual love. By this means husband and wife act in accordance with their nature which is spiritual as well as corporeal, they respect each other's personal dignity, and they establish that intimate personal relationship which conduces best to the security and harmonious development of their child. To divorce the biological act from the intimacy of the conjugal act is to do violence to human nature and to thwart the full and proper achievement of its purpose.

6. This purpose is safeguarded by the element of exclusiveness in the matrimonial contract. Although every individual marriage is born of the free consent of the parties, the terms of the contract itself are determined by a higher law which envisages primarily the good of mankind in general. Since, as God Himself has indicated (*Genesis* 2:24), the good of mankind requires that a man "shall cleave to his wife" in an exclusive

union, the right to procreative acts is restricted to their mutual intercourse and cannot therefore be ceded to a third party even by mutual consent.

7. Even marriage does not give the parties an absolute right to the achievement of the end for which the generative faculty is primarily designed, the conception of a child. A right to children is not in the terms of the contract. What is given and received by husband and wife is not a right to children, but a permanent and exclusive right to perform together natural acts of sexual intercourse which are of themselves conducive to generation.

8. One may not therefore argue, either from the nature of the sexual faculty, or from the nature of the matrimonial contract, that a married couple have a right to achieve conception by artificial means. The most one can argue is that they have a right to promote the efficiency of the natural means by facilitating the act of conjugal intercourse, or by help-

ing it to achieve its effects.

#### **Summary and Conclusions**

Respect for the order divinely established in human nature requires that the generative faculty be used only within marriage, between husband and wife, in conjugal intercourse:

"within marriage"-artificial insemination of an unmarried woman is

therefore rejected,

"between husband and wife"-artificial insemination of a wife with

donor's seed is therefore rejected,

"in conjugal intercourse"-artificial insemination of a wife with the husband's seed obtained apart from intercourse is therefore rejected; but not what is termed "assisted insemination," whereby after the natural act of intercourse the husband's seed is projected from the vagina into the uterus.

#### П

#### THE IMPEDIMENT OF IMPOTENCE IN CANON LAW

The contract of marriage consists of an exchange of rights between the contracting parties to perform together acts of sexual intercourse which are of themselves conducive to generation. If one of the parties is incapable of sexual intercourse and will remain incapable, no contract of marriage can be made.

The Church's Law in this matter is stated in Canon 1068.

Antecedent and perpetual impotence, of the man or of the woman, whether it is known to the other party or not, whether it is absolute or relative, is by the law of nature a nullifying impediment to a marriage.

Impotence is considered perpetual if it will not cease naturally, and cannot be cured by any morally lawful means. It is absolute, if it excludes capacity for sexual intercourse altogether. It is relative, if it excludes capacity for sexual intercourse between the particular persons concerned.

The fact that generation may be possible, or may have been achieved, by artificial insemination of the man's seed would not make valid a

marriage invalid from the impediment of impotence.

The fact that a wife had conceived a child by artificial insemination with the seed of her husband, or with the seed of a donor, even if the latter were done with her husband's consent, would not prevent either party from impugning the validity of their marriage on the ground of impotence. A party is estopped in an ecclesiastical court from impugning the validity of a marriage only if he or she was the directly willful and culpable cause of the alleged nullity.

Infertility is not of itself an impediment to a valid marriage.

#### Legitimacy in Canon Law

Canon Law may be said to favor legitimacy. It regards as legitimate the issue of a merely putative marriage. An invalid marriage, duly contracted, is deemed putative for as long as at least one party remains honestly unaware of the invalidity. In a marriage which is invalid through impotence, a child conceived through artificial insemination of the husband's seed before both parties realized the invalidity of their union, would be legitimate, and would remain so, even if the marriage were later canonically declared to be null. A child conceived in this manner after both parties had realized that their union was invalid, would be regarded as illegitimate.

A child born within a valid or putative marriage by artificial insemination of a donor's seed would be regarded as illegitimate once the fact

were proved.

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#### ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION FROM A DONOR

From the preceding outline of the Church's teaching it will have been seen why we consider that artificial insemination from a donor should

in principle be rejected as contrary to the laws of human nature. In our view the practice cannot fail to affect adversely society, the institution of marriage, the family, the relations between husband and wife and the child.

From the purely scientific point of view we have been unable to find any satisfactory evidence of the genetic, psychological and sociological consequences of artificial insemination from a donor. The statements of its practitioners have to be treated with considerable reserve for they have made no adequate follow-up studies. If the practice were to be studied scientifically the assessment of results would have to be impartial, the observer having no interest in the outcome.

We have however drawn inferences of probable results in the light of general moral and psychological principles and from experience in the care and education of children, and we submit the following con-

siderations:

1. The institution of marriage cannot but be altered if it is accepted as justifiable that a wife should allow herself to be impregnated with the seed of another man, or that a husband should accept the fact of such a pregnancy with equanimity. Public opinion trained to a tolerance of artificial insemination by a donor (A.I.D.) is likely to become more indifferent to a breaking of the marriage vows by normal intercourse with third parties. Obviously couples who practise A.I.D. retain some regard for the exclusiveness of the marriage relationship, which leads them to prefer this method to ordinary adultery. But others might well be inclined to ignore the difference of method and to consider only the similarity of result.

2. Deception seems inevitably connected with artificial insemination—deception of the child, of the family, of friends, of society. Advocates of the practice express approval of falsification of information in birth registers. If such a precedent is accepted there seems no reason why

this policy of deceit, where convenient, should stop at A.I.D.

3. Responsibility of doctors. Apart from the intrinsic immorality of the practice, the doctors co-operating in it assume responsibilities they are not in a position to discharge. However excellent their judgment, they must depend on secondhand or ex parte statements as to the character, heredity, and mental and physical health of the parties. The claims so confidently made as to the doctor's knowledge of the character, morals and motives of candidates for A.I.D., and of donors, appear to us completely unsubstantiated. How such information is acquired is not clear.

4. Secrecy. The question of secrecy raises a dilemma impossible to solve satisfactorily, which is not surprising in a situation which should never be allowed to arise.

i. It is held that there should be the utmost secrecy and that the child should not know his mode of conception. Experience with adoption has shown the injurious effects on the child of a policy of

secrecy when the truth or even rumors come out.

ii. It is unrealistic to suppose that secrecy could be guaranteed. It may be broken by a careless or angry word, or by the discovery of a reference to the circumstances in a document. Before resorting to A.I.D. a couple are likely to have discussed their problem of sterility with relatives or friends, so that the birth of a child may raise doubts.

iii. The husband's parents have either to be told the truth or encouraged to believe an A.I.D. child is their grandchild, when in fact he is no blood relation at all. Secrecy of this sort means not mere

silence, but active deceit cutting at the roots of family life.

iv. If secrecy is not preserved, the husband and wife have the task of making to the child an explanation which of its nature will be bewildering, unwelcome and repellent. Although adopted children can accept fairly readily the fact of adoption they find illegitimacy hard to accept. One would think that it would be even harder for a child to accept the fact of conception by A.I.D.

5. Consanguinity. It is hard to see how any system of recording A.I.D. births could safeguard against consanguineous unions, however rare these at present are likely to be. To be effective everyone marrying would have to produce a birth certificate; but in view of the common practice of mixing semen it would seem impossible to detect false or

misleading entries in a birth register.

6. Donors in the A.I.D. procedure are prepared to function as human stallions, begetting children they are never to know, of whose existence they may not even be informed, and for whom they accept no responsibility. They accept the possibility of parenthood, but at the same time deliberately reject parental obligations. Indeed, they are kept ignorant of the identity of the woman their semen is to impregnate, and can know nothing at first hand of the conditions under which their child will be reared. They connive with an unknown woman to violate her marriage vows, and if married they violate their own.

7. Psychological considerations.

i. Motives advanced for A.I.D. are the insatiable desire of a woman

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to bear a child of her own, and the desire of a man to escape from a sense of inferiority. Both these motives indicate a lack of adaptive capacity which is the hallmark of the inadequate personality. On psychological grounds a practice which of itself places further stress on adaptive capacity is unsound.

ii. A husband and wife resorting to A.I.D. would seem to be excessively preoccupied with their own interests rather than those of the child whom they consider bringing into the world by this means. Experience in adoption has shown how a child may suffer if it is used primarily as a means of curing a difficult situation in a marriage.

iii. Vaginismus and impotence, conditions for which A.I.D. may be sought as a remedy, are commonly neurotic manifestations, which would strengthen the suspicion that the recipients are frequently not psychologically healthy.

iv. Where the defect is a physical one in the man it has been contended that his self-respect could be helped by A.I.D. If this is through a public belief that the child is his own, it must be condemned as unhealthy from a psychological viewpoint, being deliberately founded on what is known to be a false assumption.

v. Pride in paternity goes deep and the fact remains that an A.I.D. child is the wife's and not the husband's. An underlying resentment may well find expression in hostility to the wife and child.

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#### LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The legal recommendation we consider to be ideally necessary may not be considered capable of enforcement. Artificial insemination by donor has such dangerous potentialities that in the public interest we recommend: That artificial insemination by donor should be made an offence under The Offences against the Person Act of 1861.

We recognize however that a legislative measure of this kind may be judged to be impracticable. If that be so, we urge that the law should at least refrain from giving any positive support or favor to A.I.D. and those who practise it.

We recommend as both feasible and desirable in the public interest:

1) That the maintaining of a bank of donors and the sale of semen be made illegal; 2) That the recognition by law of antecedent and perpetual impotence as a cause of nullity of marriage remain unchanged, even if a child has been born by artificial insemination with the seed of husband or donor; 3) That in the event of a woman being inseminated with the seed of a donor without consent of her husband, the husband be entitled to cite the inseminator and the donor as respondents or parties cited and to claim against them for costs and for damages; 4) Our attitude to divorce is known, but we consider that artificial insemination by donor should be made a ground for judicial separation under the same conditions as adultery, i.e., unless the husband has consented to, or has condoned, the insemination.

#### V

#### OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

1. March 25, 1897. The Holy Office, the highest tribunal of the Church in moral questions, to the query "whether artificial insemination of a woman may be used," replied: "It is not lawful."

2. September 29, 1949, Pius XII in an address to the Fourth International Congress of Catholic Doctors said:

Artificial insemination of human beings cannot be considered exclusively or even primarily from a biological and medical point of view,

without reference to the moral and legal position.

1. Artifical insemination outside marriage must be condemned without qualification as immoral. Natural and divine law both ordain that only marriage should lead to the begetting of children. Marriage alone safeguards the dignity of husband and wife (notably the wife's in this case) and their good estate, and is of its nature the only guarantee of the children's well-being and proper upbringing. Obviously there can be no divergence of opinion among Catholics about condemning artificial insemination outside marriage. A child conceived in this way would be

ipso facto illegitimate.

2. Artificial insemination within marriage but induced by a donor's seed is equally immoral and is to be condemned as such unconditionally. Husband and wife alone have a reciprocal right over each other's body for the begetting of a child. This right is exclusive and inalienable and cannot be ceded to another. Indeed it must be so out of consideration for the child. Nature lays upon those who give life to a child the responsibility for its care and upbringing. But between the husband of the marriage and the child born from a donor's seed (even with the husband's consent) there is no bond of descent, nor the moral and legal bonds which exist when the child is begot by husband and wife in marriage.

3. As for the lawfulness of artificial insemination within marriage, we will merely remind you of these principles of natural law: the mere fact that a desired result is attained in this way is not sufficient to justify the means employed; nor does the wish for a child, in itself

so good, make it right for husband and wife to have recourse to artificial insemination in order to fulfil that wish.

It would be wrong to think that the possibility of using such a practice could make valid a marriage between persons who are incapable of contracting marriage because of the impediment of impotence.

There should be no need to point out that it is never permissible to obtain semen by unnatural acts.

New methods must not be excluded a priori merely because they are new—but artificial insemination must not only be treated with extreme reserve but utterly shunned. This does not necessarily proscribe the use of certain artificial means of facilitating the natural act or of helping its fulfilment when normally carried out.

We must never forget this: only when it is carried out according to the will and plan of the Creator does the act of procreating a new life truly achieve, and in so wonderfully perfect a way, the ends sought by it. For then at one and the same time it is true to and satisfies the physical and spiritual nature of man and wife, their dignity as persons, and the normal and happy development of the child (Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1949, XLI, p. 559).

3. May 19, 1956. Pius XII spoke again on this subject in an address to the Second World Congress on Fertility and Sterility:

The Church has refused to entertain any conception of marriage turned in on itself, in which husband and wife selfishly seek only their own physical and emotional satisfaction. But the Church has also refused to entertain the opposite attitude which would seek to separate in generation the biological act from the personal relationship of husband and wife.

The child is born of the union of man and wife-but that union in its fullest expression should consist of organic functions bound up with tender feelings and inspired by an unselfish spiritual love. The biological requirements of generation should be fulfilled in the setting of such an integral human act. It is never right deliberately to separate the different aspects of marital union to the point of excluding positively either its procreative purpose or the personal relationship of husband and wife. The relationship uniting father and mother to their child springs from organic fact, but still more from their deliberate surrendering of themselves to each other. Their very will to give themselves develops and finds its full achievement in the child they bring into the world. Indeed, unless they dedicate themselves in a spirit of generosity to this arduous task, accepting with full awareness the responsibilities it involves, there can be no guarantee that children will be educated with all the care, courage and patience that is required. It is therefore clear that human fecundity transcends the physical plane and has essential moral aspects which must be borne in mind, even when the subject is treated from the medical point of view. . . .

The means by which one seeks to produce a new life are themselves of vital significance for human beings. They are inseparably connected with the end sought. If they do not conform to the true nature of things and to the laws written in our very being they are liable to cause grave harm to that end. . . .

We have already given our views on the moral issues raised by artificial insemination in an address to doctors on September 29, 1949, but, since the practice is spreading, and to correct some mistaken ideas as to our teaching on the subject, we now add the following:

Artificial insemination is beyond the right which husband and wife acquire by the contract of marriage, i.e. the right to a full exercise of their natural sexual activity in the natural fulfillment of the marriage act. The marriage contract does not give them a right to artificial insemination. Such a right is in no way contained in the right to the natural marriage act, and can in no way be derived from it. Still less can one derive it from a right to "children"—as the first "end" of marriage. The marriage contract does not give this right, for it has as its object not "children" as such, but "natural acts" which are capable of and designed for the begetting of children. One must then say that artificial insemination violates the natural law and is immoral (Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1956, XLVIII, p. 468).

#### -Unity Begins with Charity-

If, indeed, Christianity is a spectacle to the world, it is also a scandal of history. Established on love, Christians have significantly lacked it even more wantonly for each other. Here Christianity has still to record its greatest triumph since its birth. Ultimate unity will come, in God's good time, not so much by sharpening the arguments for our respective religious disagreements (real as they are), but by stressing the common language of love—for fruitful "dialogue." If we must talk about our differences and shortcomings, let's not be too hasty about casting the first stone. Granted that theological right can only be wholly on one side—as indeed it must be if God is one and truth is consistent—it has not always been faultlessly applied by human beings.—Theodore J. Vittoria, S.S.P., in The Catholic Home Messenger, July, 1960.

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